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Abstract 
 
While the ways in which fans interact and consume sports has evolved in response to new and 
broadcast media, the most profound change for cities from sports is its linkage to real estate 
development.  This emerging dimension to the ability of sports to redistribute regional economic 
activity creates critical public policy, business, and urban planning outcomes and potential.  This 
dissertation identifies the ways in which the sports business has changed and illustrates the ways 
in which these effects can be channeled to benefit cities.  For desired outcomes to occur, 
however, management and administrative systems have to be created that permit cities to realize 
the possible advantages. It is also possible that the ways in which sports projects are explained 
and presented to voters also needs to be changed.  These understandings are vital because the 
positive outcomes for cities from sports and real estate development cannot occur without new 
decision-making presentations and management systems. This dissertation contributes to a 
greater understanding of these new requirements and the relationship between sports and real 
estate development (and its effects on cities) through three separate studies centered on the issues 
of decision-making, urban planning, and economic and neighborhood development. The research 
is fashioned to examine processes, designs, and approaches that increase the probability of gains 
for both teams and the public sector in their development partnerships. The research efforts are 
interconnected in that they contribute to and expand upon an innovative, developing thread of 
scholarship in the spatial effects of sports for local economies.  Each study covers an important 
segment of the sports and urban development process that frames this new approach to sport 
management. The studies focus on (a) voter preferences and reactions to public subsidies for 
sports facility construction, (b) planned and unforeseen outcomes of a master planned 
neighborhood anchored by a new ballpark, and (c) the formation of the needed organizational 
structures to ensure outcomes from a linkage of sports to real estate development can be 
facilitated to produce desired local effects. 
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Chapter 1 – Towards a New Framework for Managing Sport 
Introduction 
 The business of sports management has undergone several important changes across the 
past 20 years (Chapin, 2004; Newman, 2006; Winfree and Rosentraub, 2012).  While media and 
Internet-based products and delivery systems are producing far more income for teams and 
leagues than ever before, these vital revenue streams do not represent a structural change in the 
sports business.   Fans listened to the first recreation of games in 1921; earlier telegraph 
operators transmitted game details to eager fans who sometimes listened to descriptions provided 
by locally-based announcers who recreated descriptions of the game (Wenner, 1989).  Televised 
games and the use of the Internet to distribute games and other materials to fans is a new 
application of the concept of transmission and dissemination of game and team news (Turner, 
1999; Noll, 2007).  In a similar vein luxury seating, and the provision of different in-game 
amenities, is also a modern application of the practice of offering to fans enhanced views of the 
action on the field and more comfortable settings in which to see the competition that takes place 
(Rosner and Shropshire, 2004).  As a result, realizing that Romans also had luxury seating (Conti, 
2003), the provision of more comfortable settings for fans is not a novel twist on the sports 
business (Sam and Hughson, 2013).  Team owners have always strived to provide a better venue 
for a team’s fans, and that was the application of marketing principles to sports.  More amenities 
allow teams to segment their market base and offer to different fans customized experiences at 
varying price points (Zimbalist, 1992; Keri, 2006). 
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  The profound change in and for sports management and the business of sports has been 
the focus on mixed-use real estate development anchored by and to sports venues.  The extent to 
which this change has added a new dimension to the sports business is underscored by the (1) 
recent decision of the Atlanta Braves to relocate to suburban Cobb County where the team will 
be able to build a new ballpark and develop 65 acres adjacent to the venue; (2) The Detroit Red 
Wings’ commitment to the building of at least $200 million of new or renovated mixed-use 
properties adjacent to a new arena; (3) the building a new arena for the Edmonton Oilers 
anchored by millions of dollars of new downtown real estate projects; (4) the Green Bay Packers 
and Calgary Flames’ interest in large-scale real estate projects adjacent to a historic (and 
renovated) football stadium and a new proposed arena; and (5) plans announced by Dan Gilbert 
for hundreds of millions of dollars of new real estate development adjacent to the Quicken Loans 
Arena in Cleveland. 
 These recent activities are in addition to substantial projects already completed and 
anchored by adjacent and adjoining real estate such as PETCO Park and the Ballpark District in 
San Diego, the Staples Center and L.A. LIVE in Los Angeles, the Verizon Center in Washington, 
DC, and Nationwide Arena and the Arena District in Columbus (Ohio).  Billions of dollars of 
real estate development have been built surrounding numerous sports venues in Denver and 
Indianapolis and there are plans for substantial real estate activity near the proposed arena in 
downtown Seattle.  The largest real estate development project anchored by a sports venue may 
well be what is projected and planned for the land adjacent to and across from Citi Field in 
Queens, New York. That development represents approximately $3 billion dollars of private 
investment within an outer borough that historically has been overlooked by developers (Erie, 
Kogan, and MacKenzie, 2010). 
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  This new dimension to sports management and the business of sports raises numerous 
public policy, business, and urban planning issues.  These questions or issues are posed or raised 
because in no instances can any of these projects proceed without substantial cooperation and 
support from the public sector.  At a minimum, even in the absence of an investment by the 
public sector in the real estate projects or the venue used by a team, the development of 
substantial tracts of land near or adjacent to a venue requires zoning approvals and infrastructure 
changes.  Each of these actions requires support and/or approval from the public sector.  In some 
instances, when large-scale activities accompanied by substantial private sector investments take 
place, the public sector is asked to establish new politically defined urban districts (some with 
substantial political authority, others limited to issues associated with physical development) or 
be willing to provide to a single investor (usually the team owner or a subsidiary of the owner’s 
businesses) master developer status.  Politically defined urban districts routinely play a key role 
in the financing of a facility. Master developer status provides an individual investor or company 
with control over what is to be built within a designated area even though a city or county must 
approve the broad dimensions of what is to be built.  In essence, within agreed to guidelines, the 
master developer is free to build projects that will be sustained by market conditions.  In addition 
the master developer is assured that no other investor can build a project that conflicts with the 
plans agreed to by the master developer and the city. The public policy issues or questions 
become even more pertinent when a city, county, a regional group of cities or counties, or a state 
government is asked to invest tax revenues in the building of the needed arena, ballpark, and 
stadium or forego tax revenues as a result of abatements, tax expenditures, or the creation of tax 
increment districts (Long, 2012).   
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 This dissertation is organized under a paradigm that argued for cities there are two main channels 
of growth. Growth occurs in cities either through substantial increases in population (which 
attracts private capital to meet increased demands for housing, services, etc. – a demand push 
model), or by innovation.  Innovation attracts capital seeking to take advantage of the new 
products or processes created by these new ideas.  This could be characterized as a supply side 
focus to creating economic development. 
 The focus on the role of innovation in the creation of wealth begins with the work of 
Alfred Marshall (1890) in the late 19th century encapsulated by his concept of “ideas in the air.”  
By “ideas in the air” Marshall meant that concentrations of human capital lead to the generation 
of new products and process as people literally “bounced ideas” off the knowledge of each other.  
His work was followed by Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) focus on wealth linked to creative 
destruction.  This idea was posited in the late 1930s and early 1940s as he saw changes in the 
distribution of wealth linked to the formulation of new ideas, products, and processes that 
essentially made older items obsolete.  Creative destruction in its ultimate form would lead to a 
change in the economic hierarchy of cities. 
 Both scholars argued that well trained labor were essential, if not responsible, for the 
creation of new wealth.  Marshall and Schumpeter both argued that it was the daily and often 
times accidental interactions amongst the aforementioned highly trained individuals that were 
critical to innovation and the creation of wealth.  
 Cities play an important role in growth creation because their intimate environments 
foster these interactions.  Jane Jacobs (1961) first argued that cities were the home for complex 
economic and social processes and organizations, and that cities should be designed in a manner 
that fostered these processes.  Jacobs believed that cities had a need for both areas of decline 
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 (low rent) at the same time other neighborhoods that would attract successful businesses and 
residential areas for Schumpeter’s creative destroyers.  The lower cost areas would then be an 
attractive place for start-up business and entrepreneurs to pioneer their revolutionary concepts at 
an affordable price (low factor input).   
 Jacobs could not have foreseen the impact that declining transportation and 
communication costs would have on the locational decisions of both business and people once 
success was achieved.  Michael Porter’s (1985) work on the importance of industry clusters for 
economic growth within cities highlights the need for the attraction and retention of human 
capital just as Jacobs’ did.  He, however, was not concerned if that cluster was in one city or 
spread across a metropolitan area.  If that cluster, however, was located in suburban or exurban 
cities – a function of declining factor input costs – then in effect the fiscal returns Jacobs saw 
from life from death would not benefit a central city. 
 Richard Florida (2005) capitalized on these ideas, by focusing cities’ attention on the 
importance of culture and amenity packages that were attractive to what he called the creative 
class. The challenge for cities in an era in which transportation and communication costs no 
longer dictate locational decisions is where can they prudently place their investments to impact 
the economic geography of their regions.  Previously city leaders were led to believe that their 
investments in stand-alone sports facilities would provide the elixir to attract residents back to 
their declining central cities. Rosentraub and others dispelled this notion in the late 1990s.  A 
1996 Brookings Conference in Washington D.C. focused on sports and economic effects 
engendered a conversation about how cities and teams could do better by leveraging these 
investments for real economic development.  Instead of simply capitulating to the cartel 
environment that is professional sports, heeding advice of academics city leaders began to 
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 believe it was to play “hardball” with team owners.  Following the lessons learned from 
development in San Diego and Los Angeles around sports facilities for the Padres, 
Lakers/Kings/Clippers, Rosentraub (2010) posited that cities could enter into public/private 
partnerships with sports franchises that could accomplish goals that satisfied both parties. Instead 
of public investments simply being used to construct sports venues, cities could realize 
significant levels of private investment to neglected communities by influencing the placement 
of new facilities and requiring that in exchange for public investments new levels of ancillary 
real estate development should be contractually required.  
 
Why Sports and Real Estate? 
 Before exploring the range of new public policy issues raised by the change in the sports 
business, and the need for research that addresses the three specific areas that are the focus of 
this dissertation, there is value in exploring exactly why real estate development has become 
linked to sports.  Across the last several decades the principals of leading real estate firms in the 
United States have acquired sports properties (teams) that were then located in venues adjacent 
to real estate that could be developed to meet emerging market demand.  For example, Forest 
City Enterprises acquired the New Jersey Nets.  The company then built a new arena for the team 
in Brooklyn that will be surrounded by a large real estate development project.  Dan Gilbert’s 
large conglomerate acquired the Cleveland Cavaliers and an arena that are now lynchpins of a 
large real estate development plan in Cleveland.  Sterling Equities has also positioned the New 
York Mets and Citi Field to be at the center of a large-scale development in Queens.  AEG 
Worldwide used Staples Center and the Los Angeles Kings and Lakers to anchor its flagship 
development LA LIVE (Rich, 2000; Carter, 2010).  
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 How did real estate development become linked to sports? 
 The confluence of real estate development and sport is not a surprising outcome given the 
prominent role that sport has always played in society and its ability to attract large crowds to 
numerous games.  In the case of an arena, a large number of entertainment shows are also hosted.  
Baseball teams can regularly attract more than 3 million visits to their games.  Numerous arenas 
attract more than 1 million visits each year.  This concentration of activity elevates the value and 
attractiveness of adjacent real estate.  No other activity attracts as many distinctive visits each 
year as does sports making teams valuable assets for real estate development activities. The 
limited number of franchises in each market makes it possible to build a development strategy 
around a unique asset. The power to transform land use and the built environment exists with the 
understanding that millions of visits each year will be guaranteed at a given location (Harrigan, 
1998; Warren, 1994). What can and has been done to capitalize on this dynamic is what has 
altered the sports business.  
Sports facilities built in the late 1970s, 80s, and early 90s were routinely designed to 
enhance in-facility experiences but routinely ignored the potential for harnessing associated 
economic activity that could take place on adjacent real estate.  Facilities built during this time 
period were constructed with substantial public investments.  The failure to elevate property 
values and capitalize on the economic activity taking place within the venue generated 
substantial levels of discontent with the decision to support a team’s effort to secure a new venue.   
As a result, all of the benefits from the building of venues accrued to team owners and others 
linked to the sports industry.  There was little if any financial return to the public sector partners.  
The situation was made worse when team owners were allowed to retain most if not all of the 
revenue streams that were created in these new state-of-the-art facilities (Rosentraub, 1997; 
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 Zimbalist and Long, 2006).  As revenue sharing among franchises and with labor has become 
standard (with increasing prominence in discussion) in the major sports leagues, team owners 
acting as profit maximizers, are in no doubt searching for ways to create revenue streams 
leveraged from the team as an asset but produce what are considered non-sport related revenues.  
Profits from related-real estate development are not part of any sports leagues revenue sharing 
agreements (Zimblist, 2006; Rosentraub and Swindell, 2009).    
 The building of Oriole Park at Camden Yards for the Baltimore Orioles in the early 
1990’s, and its integration in the plan to revitalize Baltimore’s Harborplace, is often credited 
with spurring the return of stadia to downtown areas, and fostered a greater appreciation for their 
ability revitalize, create, and sustain downtown neighborhoods (Rowe and Stevenson, 1994; 
Chapin, 2004). The combination of sports, entertainment, and culture is a three-pronged 
approach that has been used by many cities in efforts to rebuild and revitalize their downtown 
areas and project a new image for a city.  Empirical assessments of the economic effects of 
sports and entertainment venues has clearly established that these amenities alone or even 
together do little, if anything to change or improve a host city’s regional economy. The spending 
that takes place at these venues would occur within the region with or without the presence of the 
sports facility.  In the absence of the facility that consumer would simply spend his or her money 
elsewhere within the region.  Even if the region is a major tourist attraction, it is understood that 
little or no new regional economic development will occur. What sports facilities do have the 
ability to impact is where within a region that spending will occur and if that economic activity 
is linked to real estate development, meaningful economic changes can occur for the host city 
(including enhanced tax revenues).  The substantial neighborhood level changes that can and 
have occurred due to the presence of a master planned development anchored to sports facility 
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 are illustrated in the transformation of previously underdeveloped or blighted land within the 
downtown areas of San Diego and Los Angeles, California (Mills and Hamilton, 1997; Wojan, 
Lambert, and McGranahan, 2007).  
The Accidental Marriage and A Master Strategy 
 The City of San Diego and its civic leaders were facing the decline and deterioration in 
the East Village of downtown San Diego during the 1990s. The East Village had an unrealized 
potential that was not being tapped for redevelopment by the private sector even though it was 
near the coast, a renovated entertainment center (the Gaslamp District), and the substantial public 
sector investments in a convention center. The underdeveloped neighborhood with some blighted 
parcels was presenting an undesirable image of the city to the many visitors at its convention 
center.  In addition city leadership was witnessing the growth of suburban cities surrounding San 
Diego and new developments further and further from the downtown area but inside the city.  In 
brief, the city and region was beginning to sprawl in a manner that it made it appear to be headed 
to become a smaller version of Los Angeles (Lang & Simmons, 2001).  
 The San Diego Padres were created as an expansion franchise in 1969 and played their 
home games in what is now known as Qualcomm Stadium.  That venue was built for the San 
Diego Chargers and their lease gave them control of game day revenues for all professional 
sports games played at the facility.  This lease arrangement reduced the income potential and 
revenue streams available to the Padres.   John Moores purchased the Padres in 1994 and 
immediately recognized that this model was neither sustainable nor advantageous for his new 
ball club.  He began a quest to build a baseball-specific venue for the Padres.  Moores’ was 
looking for an investment from the public sector to help build his new stadium which would 
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 secure San Diego as the long term home of the Padres. The city, in addition to their desire to lock 
the Padres in long term, had aspirations of adding 1,000 hotel rooms to downtown to support 
convention center business and secure new investment in real estate downtown. These needs 
created the possibility of forming a public/private partnership between the City and the team. 
The City of San Diego in return for its investment and contribution to the building of PETCO 
Park, received a guarantee from John Moore’s that in addition to the team’s contribution of 
approximately $187 million to construct the ballpark, he would cause to be built almost $500 
million in ancillary real estate development in the neighborhood surrounding the ballpark 
(Rosentraub, 2010).  
Figure 1. RFP Zone of the Ballpark District, Memorandum of Understanding; City of San Diego  
 
Source: http://www.sandiego.gov/petcopark/mou/attachd.shtml  
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  In order to ensure that the city’s goals for the type of development they wished to occur 
in the neighborhood were met, the city entered into a master developer agreement with Mr. 
Moores to develop the Ballpark District. The agreement outlined the overall mix of development 
that Mr. Moores’ company, JMI Investments, could build.  These details and restrictions went 
beyond the normal zoning restrictions often placed on land uses.  What was unique in this 
agreement was that San Diego required that the development be done in a manner that enhanced 
the visual and aesthetic appeal of the new neighborhood.  An integral piece of the redevelopment 
strategy used in San Diego was the role that local governmental units played in assembling the 
necessary land for both the ballpark and the planned surrounding district. The policy decision 
made by the city to actively pursue and assemble large of swaths of land with the intention of 
delivering those parcels to a private developer in order to accomplish their goals of neighborhood 
revitalization is a significant market intervention.  Other prospective developers looking to invest 
in development around a sports facility are in essence excluded.  By selecting a master developer 
the government created a situation where any development that occurs will flow through the 
business/developer that was selected.  
 Local and state governments have heeded the advice of academics regarding the lack of 
return from past dealings with major league franchises.  Partnerships were established with 
franchises that often put a local governmental agency into a situation where they were providing 
direct and annual required operating subsidies to franchises as part of the leases for new venues 
without guarantees for related real estate development.  The partnership between the public 
sector and John Moores was different in that it required a substantial level of new real estate 
development (guaranteed by John Moores). 
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  As previously mentioned the San Diego Chargers retained the right to stadium revenues 
as part of their original lease deal with the city.  A new lease in 1995 included renovations to 
improve Qualcomm Stadium that was paid for by the public sector.  The Chargers also secured 
two other key concessions from the city.  First, the city guaranteed the sale of 60,000 non-luxury 
seats to every home game for at least 10 years. If those seats went empty the city purchased the 
tickets and transferred funds to the team (Rosentraub, 2010).  Qualcomm Stadium seats 
approximately 71,000 fans and also had 7,800 club seats and 113 suites.  It isn’t difficult to make 
the logical conclusion that the Chargers were able to operate under great levels of financial 
certainty in their renovated facility. This guarantee was then coupled with the city’s second 
concession to the team --  a clause that triggered their ability to renegotiate their lease team 
player costs exceed 75 percent of a designated set of revenues – called the “economic hardship” 
clause. With the NFL experiencing tremendous growth in television revenues, and the players’ 
union justifiably demanding larger portions of revenues from league ownership it was clear 
player salaries were going to increase greater than in-facility revenues. In a surprise to few, the 
Chargers began discussing the “economic hardship” clause almost as soon as the renovations 
were complete suggesting to voters that the team would consider relocation despite the 
extraordinary investments and guarantees that had already been offered.  There was an 
understandable distrust of teams and their owners (Erie, Kogan, and Mackenzie, 2010; Erie, 
Kogan, and Mackenzie, 2011).   
 Though it may have been difficult for San Diego’s leadership to foresee the tremendous 
growth in television revenues individual franchises would receive when the National Football 
League renegotiated its deals with its media partners, that mistake would not be committed again 
in San Diego. The city learned an important lesson in their deal with Chargers. Unfortunately 
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 they are paying for it today in continuing to operate under the existence of threats from the 
Chargers ownership to leave San Diego if a new stadium isn’t built on its terms.  Regardless of 
the league, type of facility, franchise popularity, championship trophies won, no local 
governmental unit needs to put itself in a position where they provide annual operating subsidies 
(especially from own source tax revenues) to sports franchises.   
The urban economic theory set forth by Tiebout, aptly named the Tiebout Hypothesis, 
suggests that consumers move from one municipality to another until they find the right mix of 
local public goods and tax payments that maximizes their utility (Tiebout, 1956). Higher income 
people can and do leave cities producing declining levels of what are referred to as own source 
revenues (local taxes accruing the local government).  Guaranteeing a long-term financial 
operating subsidy to a franchise may not be in the best fiscal interest of a local government.  
These subsidies get even more politically intolerable in slow growth economies where stories 
repeatedly arise when local government services are not adequately funded.   
 What actions did the city take in its negotiations and agreement with the Padres that 
better protected their investment and served their goals for a new neighborhood?  
 The voters of San Diego approved a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the 
Padres, the city’s Redevelopment Agency, and the city’s Center City Development Corporation 
(CCDC).  The MOU and the more detailed resulting agreement were designed to ensure that the 
redevelopment strategy would create incremental tax dollars to pay for the public’s investment in 
the ballpark and that a convention center hotel would be constructed.  
 San Diego made a concerted effort to establish benchmark goals that John Moores 
needed to meet for the development agreement to continue. For example, the city would not 
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 authorize the purchase of land necessary to start construction unless John Moores demonstrated 
that financing was in place for the building of at least 1,000 hotel rooms and $500 million in 
ancillary real estate development.  For San Diego’s approximately $290 million dollar 
investment in the ballpark project, the city assured itself the baseball team would call San Diego 
home for at least 22 years, PETCO Park was built, at least 1,000 hotel rooms developed to 
support the convention center, and a development guarantee to ensure the incremental tax 
revenues would accrue to finance its investment it the ballpark (Rosentraub, 2014).  
 The Ballpark District and PETCO Park created a template for public-private partnerships 
in the construction of sports stadia that was different than the previous set of subsidies. The 
public sector made a concerted effort to ensure that if public investment was going to be 
dedicated to the construction of a sports facility, that facility should be made part of a strategic 
plan that helped further the city’s vision for its future development.   
Los Angeles, AEG, and a Planned Effort for Downtown Los Angeles 
 In the early 1990’s the civil unrest unfolding in Los Angeles in the wake of Rodney 
King’s beating and the subsequent not guilty verdict in the trial of the involved police officers 
triggered a series of riots.  The level of violence in the city created a national image of a 
community completely out of control; private sector investment in the downtown area 
plummeted.  Perception, as often is the case, did not match the reality of the fundamental 
changes happening in downtown Los Angeles.  Crime rates in the area actually declined in 1993 
and 1994.  Nevertheless, the Los Angeles Convention Center (LACC) was not attracting the 
number of meetings and visitors needed to repay the bonds sold to build the facility.  The 
convention center had been an on-going financial quagmire for local government since its 
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 opening in 1971. Anticipated attendance levels and traffic in conjunction with the facility didn’t 
reach the anticipated levels and revenues were insufficient to pay for its expenses.  Leadership 
decided an expansion to 500,000 square feet of exhibition space would alleviate its troubles by 
allowing it to accommodate and attract a larger range of exhibitions and trade shows.  The idea 
that more convention center space will help alleviate sagging attendance and trade show levels 
by seeking larger-scale events is not a tactic unique to Los Angeles.  Indeed, the convention 
center business or climate has seen a boom in building that routinely does not produce the 
anticipated returns on investment even after expansions occur (Sanders, 1998). The blighted area 
surrounding the convention center was also not as asset for marketing the faltering center.  As a 
result the LACC became a continual drain on the general revenue fund of local governments 
(Rosentraub, 2010, Rosentraub, 2014). 
 The Staples Center, home to the NBA/NHL’s Lakers, Clippers, and Kings, and the L.A. 
LIVE entertainment complex were built as a part of a development strategy put in place by city 
leadership in conjunction with A.E.G. Worldwide to both address the convention center’s 
financial woes and create a new downtown entertainment district and destination that could 
anchor a revitalization of the area.  To put it succinctly, the city’s main purpose in entering into 
the agreement with A.E.G. was to reduce the fiscal losses being incurred by the convention 
center.  Any additional outcomes and changes that occurred in Los Angeles would be an 
ancillary, but not unwelcomed, development or benefit.  The city had goals for the outcomes of 
its public/private partnership. They wanted the facilities built as close as possible the convention 
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 center and all deteriorating buildings near the convention center were to be replaced.  Lastly, the 
new arena had to be built without any public subsidies1.  
 The mechanics of the deal to redevelop downtown Los Angeles was replete with 
provisions that bound AEG Worldwide to performance guidelines.  In exchange Los Angeles 
agreed to assemble the needed land for what became L. A. LIVE. The L.A. Arena Company was 
created by AEG (Phil Anschutz and Majestic Realty (Ed Roski) to build and manage the 
STAPLES Center.  A second company was created owned only by AEG to build a large 
entertainment complex across a narrow street from the arena and the convention center.  What 
was later named L. A. LIVE included a new headquarter hotel and commercial space that served 
as the west coast studios of ESPN and of AEG Worldwide.  As part of the agreement the 
proposed entertainment complex and hotel was to be under construction within seven years of 
the agreement. AEG worked diligently to acquire the necessary land for the development 
immediately after construction of the STAPLES Center was initiated. The company was unable 
to unable to obtain all of the necessary land.  Los Angeles’ redevelopment agency used its 
powers of eminent domain to obtain the needed final parcels. These parcels were then sold to 
AEG.  In the past few years cities have been increasingly reluctant to use eminent domain to 
acquire land.   In addition, many states have placed stricter limits on the use of eminent domain. 
That political decision, however, does make redevelopment processes more difficult and 
expensive.  In the current anti-eminent domain milieu, redevelopment efforts depend on existing 
land owners and governments reaching agreements that make economic sense for the new 
developer. Los Angeles at the time that L.A. LIVE was to be built, was able to use the power of 
eminent domain to facilitate the redevelopment process.  With the land acquired Los Angeles 
1 Whether or not the Staples Center was built completely without subsidy is up for debate. If the eventual subsidies 
provided for the hotel in the deals renegotiation are considered then this goal could be seen as unaccomplished.  
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 was able to also negotiate with AEG for a detailed development plan that met its requirements 
and its vision for a revitalized downtown area. 
 Los Angeles’ strategic plan for the revitalization of its downtown area was to utilize the 
STAPLES Center as the anchor in a sports and entertainment district that it hoped would 
improve the competitive posture of the convention center while also encouraging other 
developers to build new residences (often by repurposing abandoned commercial properties).  
The city utilized its assets and ability to assemble land to create the right type of investment 
package to funnel development to a strategic area that it believed would transform the image of 
Los Angeles and advance some of the city’s financial goals and plans for downtown (Rosentraub, 
2014).  
 The Public Policy Questions and The Dearth of Literature (regional v. micro effects) 
 What recent arena, ballpark, and stadium development projects have illustrated is that 
team owners in their negotiations and dealings with the public sector are looking to create 
partnerships that allow them to expand upon their asset.  That expansion involves large-scale real 
estate projects that produce new revenue streams for the owner even when games are not played. 
There are other major public policy questions that while not part of this study also require 
attention when sports facilities are linked to adjacent real estate that includes substantial financial 
investments by the public sector. The first issue lies in the land transfers that are often part of 
these deals that in essence substitute one land use for another. Sports facility anchored 
development projects are often tapped for construction in neighborhoods that were classified by 
a local government as blighted or deteriorated.  In many instances the land was also in federal 
empowerment zones which made revitalization projects eligible for special federal grants, tax 
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 credits, and other benefits.  A fair question is whether acquiring of land through eminent domain 
was is simply an effort to relocate lower income households to enhance gentrification.  
 A second important public policy issue that will not be a focus in this dissertation is the 
appropriateness of a governmental unit designating master developer status that eliminated other 
developers from key roles in projects. In designating a single entity (usually the owner or a 
subsidiary group that the team owner is a partner in) with master developer status for 
redevelopment around a sports facility, the local government has chosen a “winner” in who gets 
to develop around the facility. Other developers are not given the opportunity to bid in the 
development of land adjacent to the facility.  If other developers want to be part of the project 
they must become partners with the master developer. Whether or not local governments should 
select winners and losers in the real estate market is another critical question that warrants 
careful analysis.  Not all sports venues related real estate development projects require that cities 
designate the team owner as the master developer without a competitive bidding process. For 
example, the land adjacent Citi Field, in which Related Companies and Sterling Equities (NY 
Mets) were designated developers, was a result of an open bidding process managed by City of 
New York’s Economic Development Corporation. The city ultimately determined that the Mets 
affiliated entity proposed the most desirable redevelopment plan for the land that would satisfy a 
number of the cities criteria for development2.  
 The majority of the scholarship that currently exists on the impacts of sports venues on 
the economy focuses on regional effects (Baade, 1996; Chalip, 2002; Coates and Humphreys, 
1999; Danielson, 1997; Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Euchner, 1994; Kurtzman, 2005, for 
2 Even when land is awarded through an RFP process, like in NYC, opponents still exist. The developers of the project adjacent to Citi Field and the City of New York are currently embroiled in a lawsuit regarding the awarding process and other aspects of the project.  
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 example). The preponderance of evidence has categorically found that sports facilities do little, if 
any, to impact regional economic trends. What this dissertation aims to do is expand upon the 
minimal scholarship that does exists that assesses “micro”-level impacts of sports facilities and 
consider crucial issues that helps ensure that micro effects occurs. The work of Nelson (2002), 
Coates and Humphries (2006), Tu (2005), Affeldt and Maennig (2012), Buckman and Mack 
(2012) have initiated an understanding of the “neighborhood” level effects that these facilities 
and ancillary real estate development can have that changes intra-regional development patterns.  
None of these efforts, however, has looked at organizational issues and the administrative 
structures needed to assist in the process of urban revitalization and in ensuring that initiatives 
succeed.  In addition, the focus on neighborhood effects in efforts to secure public support for 
project and public financing has to also be anchored to an understanding of voting patterns.  
Public votes or referenda are usually required as part of any public investment in revitalization 
efforts involving sports facilities.  Influencing voters and elected officials is also a point that 
must be considered and more fully understood. 
It is important for the sport management field to adjust its focus to include these issues 
and their related points to better inform the practice of sport management and public and team 
officials.  For too long the discourse has been fixated on the lack of regional economic benefits 
that accrue following the development of sport venue or as a result of the hosting of mega-events. 
There is sufficient work already available to sustain the points that venues and events have no 
(long-lasting) regional effects and that stand-alone facilities not linked to real estate development 
has no economic value to taxpayers.   The failure to expand the discourse raises the possibility 
that the field of sport management may lose an opportunity to better inform public leaders and 
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 industry officials regarding what concepts and proposals are likely to produce important 
economic changes and be supported by the electorate and their representatives.  
The Three Issues That Are The Focus Of This Dissertation 
 My professional and academic experience working with teams, universities, and 
municipalities in their efforts to revitalize areas anchored by sports venues have helped me 
conceptualize the relationship between the facilities used by sports teams and (a) urban planning, 
(b) economic and neighborhood development, and the (c) fiscal stability of cities. This 
dissertation’s focus on three dimensions of this issue aims at adding new evidence to the effects 
and management issues associated with the use of sports venues for urban revitalization.  In 
addition, in the concluding chapter a more robust research agenda is discussed identifying the 
work that is next needed to advance the practice of using sports venues for urban development. 
The research in this dissertation is designed to look at processes, designs, and approaches that 
increase the probability of gains for both teams and public sector in their partnerships to develop 
facilities.  
 The three distinct research efforts within this dissertation are interconnected in that they 
help frame what I believe to be a valuable thread of scholarship as it pertains to the relationship 
between cities and professional sports teams and urban revitalization. Each study covers an 
important segment of the sports and urban development process that frames this new approach to 
sport management and to the relationship between teams and urban space.  
 The first study focuses on providing a greater understanding of voter behavior when 
confronted with the decision of expending public funds for a sports venue. The literature on 
public subsidies for sports stadiums is clear that the spending of public funds to construct 
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 facilities provides little, if any, overall economic benefit to the host community. Yet, time and 
time again elected officials support legislation, and introduce ballot measures, to provide invest 
in building and maintaining venues. When these decisions get placed on the ballot it provides an 
opportunity to gauge the public’s interest in supporting a facility.  This study focuses on the 
voters’ support for referendum to invest in a stadium to serve the Seattle Seahawks.  The data 
used were from the state’s most populous area, King County, which is also the county in which 
the facility is located. The key contribution to the literature of this study is its emphasis on 
understanding and explaining the spatial impacts of voter behavior. An interesting finding of this 
study was that those living closest to the proposed stadium site were least likely to vote yes at the 
ballot, but those precincts within easy access to the stadium, also higher income voters in the 
most populated precincts were dramatically more likely to vote yes in the referendum. These 
findings exhibit the tendency of “NIMBY” voting behavior, where voters nearby to the stadium 
disliked the proposal, while voters who could easily enjoy the benefits from the stadium without 
having to deal with the negative externalities were in favor.  Note also, as will be discussed later 
in this dissertation, the proposal made no mention of guaranteed levels of new real estate 
development.  Such a commitment, as the literature has shown has the ability to elevate local 
property values and thus would produce tangible results for those living closest to the venue.  
The implications of this will be discussed in the conclusions.   
 The second study in the dissertation moves to an investigation of the intended and 
unintended outcomes of a master planned neighborhood development built in conjunction with a 
new ballpark for the San Diego Padres. This study analyzed the changes, both economic and 
demographic, that have occurred in downtown San Diego since the building of the ballpark 
district and assess how the neighborhood fared compared to others within San Diego during the 
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 recession and whether or not the city’s stated goals for neighborhood development were 
accomplished. The analysis focused on the performance of the Ballpark District based on four 
different criteria: (1) the extent to which a new neighborhood was populated and sustained 
through the recession; (2) the creation of an economically integrated neighborhood in San Diego; 
(3) the ability of the Ballpark District to attract young well-educated individuals as well as older 
higher income residents, and (4) the ability of the new neighborhood to protect property values 
during the recent severe recession. The construction of a sports facility was used as a lynchpin 
for accomplishing both urban planning and public policy goals for the city of San Diego.  
 The third and final study is a discussion of the management structure or models that have 
been put into place by municipalities in their development of sports-anchored urban 
revitalization strategies.  Coordinating and navigating the nuances and complexities of 
developing public private partnerships is no small feat. Quasi-governmental agencies and/or 
special districts or authorities are routinely designated as the lead actor or decision maker in the 
negotiation and development of these partnerships. With the tremendous amount of public 
investment and trust being placed into these entities, which are generally not made up of elected 
officials but political appointees, very little research has been conducted to further understand the 
success and/or failures of these organizations and the impacts on outcomes of projects based 
upon their structures.  Intergovernmental cooperation also plays a significant role in the 
development of public private partnerships. In the examination of redevelopment strategies put 
into place in Cleveland, Indianapolis a greater understanding of the role that these special 
purpose agencies and intergovernmental cooperation play in successful redevelopment strategies 
is explored.  Attention is directed towards understanding the management structure or model 
used impact the bargaining power of the public sector agent in their negotiations with the private 
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 sector.  Simply put, successful urban revitalization strategies anchored by sports venues require 
unique management systems and the factors and reasons for this are discussed in the third study.  
Lastly this part of the dissertation will also review new partnership for an arena in Detroit for the 
Red Wings.  The purpose of that part of the dissertation is to apply the management principles 
and outcomes analyzed in the third study to what is proposed for the new Detroit Red Wings 
Arena.  That review offers insight into what might be expected and the implications for the 
future of downtown Detroit.    
  
23 
  
 Chapter 2 
Proximity, Population, and Wealth: 
The Pattern of Support for the Seahawk Stadium Referendum 
 
Dear fellow Washingtonians: 
I’ve said from the start I wouldn’t go forward with purchasing the Seahawks and building a new 
stadium and exhibition center without your approval.  Knowing a “Yes” vote will be an act of 
trust, I’d like to share my commitments to this public/private partnership…  Should we move 
forward, the new stadium and exhibition center will be a valuable asset – bringing our 
communities together and benefiting the state for decades to come. 
 
— Paul Allen (Secretary of the State of Washington, 1997, p. 4). 
 
Introduction 
Referenda voting outcomes provide important information regarding voters’ assessment of 
the value of different forms of investments and expenditures by governments.  Previous research 
has focused on voters’ support or economic behavior or responses for expanded or new public 
spending for education, health care, and nuclear power.  Relative to this dissertation and public 
support for investment in sports venues – and what can be learned from their votes and the type 
of projects that will be supported – the vote for a new stadium for the Seattle Seahawks was 
analyzed.  In particular, through inspection of the geographic distribution of affirmative votes 
controlling for numerous demographic factors, important understandings are produced about 
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 who supports public investments in sports venues.  These data also inform important policy 
recommendations regarding what could be needed when planning sports-related developments. 
The analysis is confined to the county where the facility would be built.  Examination of 
the state-level voting results shows that the highest level of support occurred in and around King 
County.  Looking at just one county in detail, especially such a critical one informs us in ways 
that looking at the same model across counties cannot.  For example, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that voters in close proximity to the site were much more likely to vote against the 
referendum, while those in (typically wealthier and more populous) precincts within short 
driving distance were much more likely to vote in favor.3   
Direct inspection of the geographic distribution of yes votes in the county suggests that a 
number of precincts near the epicenter, referred to as “SoDo” (an industrial district   just south of 
downtown Seattle south of the historic (popular) Pike’s Place market, voted against the 
referendum.  Yes votes increased beyond a small core surrounding SoDo.  Indeed, the highest 
level of yes votes occurred in the densely populated precincts where wealthier voters lived and 
with short driving access of SoDo.  This support, as will be discussed, suggests the value of 
certain real estate developments connected to a venue as a tool for engendering higher levels of 
political support.  
 Results of an empirical precinct-level voting model are entirely consistent with the 
observation that proximity and particular demographic characteristics are predictive of support 
3 Of course, every choice has a cost and ours is that we are unable to design measurements to capture the well-
known agenda control problem in referendum voting (originally, Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; see Filimon, Romer 
and Rosenthal, 1982; and Fort, 1988, 1997).  Chang and Turnbull (2002) summarize the numerous works where 
agenda control has mattered in empirical analyses of voting.  For example, the “reversion threat” does not vary for 
just a single county.  All we can say is that the vote was very close, 51.1 to 49.9, suggesting evidence of agenda 
control. 
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 for the initiative.  Voting relative to proximity, however, is much more complicated than a 
simply linear relationship. While in general support for a stadium tends to increase with 
proximity to a stadium (Coates and Humphreys 2006; Dehring, Depken II, and Ward 2008) from 
an individual voter's perspective, publicly subsidized stadiums have both positive and negative 
components.  For instance, Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2012) found that voters nearest to the 
proposed soccer stadium in Munich were more likely to vote against the referendum.  In this 
study similar results were found.  Specifically, support for CenturyLink Field is smallest nearest 
the proposed facility, but far more robust 10 to 30 miles driving distance from the stadium (in the 
nonlinear specification voting reaches a maximum at about 27.3 miles).  Further, consistent with 
previous works focused on voting at the city- and county-level, the probability of a yes vote was 
higher in precincts with wealthier residents and higher proportions of minority voters.  
Surprisingly, home tenure status (renter v. homeowner) was not related to support for the 
public’s investment in the venue.   While this is not a direct test of the so-called “homevoter” 
hypothesis, this finding could suggest that the construction (and subsidization) of the venue was 
anticipated to have a little impact on residential property values (Fischel, 2005; Dehring, Depken, 
& Ward, 2008).  Finally, the odds of a yes vote increased in precincts with older residents but 
decreased in precincts with higher proportions of white-collar workers. 
First the background on the election is discussed.  The next section describes the 
geographic distribution of yes votes across the county and its relationship to population and 
income.  The precinct-level model of the probability of a yes vote along with a description of the 
data is in the fourth section.  The results are reported in the following section with the 
conclusions in the last section.  
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 Background 
Referendum 48 was decided in a statewide special election on June 17, 1997.  The specific 
details of the stadium finance agreement can be found in the 28-page Official Washington 
Voter’s Pamphlet (Secretary of the State of Washington, 1997).  Overall, the ballot stated that the 
stadium would cost approximately $425 million with a 76-24 public-private split ($323 million 
public money).  The referendum passed with support from 51.1 of the voters—820,364 yes; 
783,584 no (Secretary of the State of Washington, 2009). 
Some revenue elements to support the public sector’s investment were added diversions 
from private spending -- $95 million would come from a mix of user and tourist taxes including 
ticket and parking taxes, and a King County (Seattle) hotel room tax extension.  The remaining 
elements in the public portion, although touted otherwise, were direct diversions of funds spent 
elsewhere across the state on public services.  The most obvious of these was sales tax 
forgiveness amounting to $101 million.  Less obvious was $127 million from a new lottery game.  
To the extent that new lottery games simply redistribute a given propensity in the population to 
gamble, this new game would divert funds from their previously allocated purpose.  In 1997, 
before the referendum passed, lottery funds were exclusively dedicated to education construction 
projects for K-12 and higher education, economic development, problem gambling prevention 
and treatment, and the state’s General Fund.  Thus, there were impacts not just on private 
spending through new revenue devices, but also on the previous distribution of public spending. 
The final element in the public portion was $27 million in tax incentives offered to the 
builders of the stadium.  Economically, it is difficult to determine the true cost of this $27 
million tax savings and "contribution."  If the next best opportunity for these builders was a 
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 purely private endeavor, was  percent the "going rate" tax break on privately 
financed development?  If the next best opportunity for these builders was a purely public 
endeavor, then this $27 million appears to be a phantom contribution; the public never would 
have born this cost in the first place since, presumably, the same tax break would have applied.  
If the latter was the case, then the true cost of the stadium was actually $398 million and the 
public-private split was 74-26 ($296 million public). 
Proponents did all they could to portray Referendum 48 as essential for ensuring the 
Seahawks would remain in Seattle, building on threats and actions by the previous owner, Ken 
Behring, to move the team to California (those details are available in Fort, 1999).  Los Angeles 
was without an NFL team and various investors had interests in securing a team that would be 
play its home games in the Los Angeles area.  Behring tried to move the Seahawks to Hollywood 
Park just prior to the referendum.  The NFL, under a league-enforced cooling off period turned 
his request down. 
During the cooling off period, Paul Allen paid $10 million for an option to buy the 
Seahawks and made it clear he would only exercise this option if a new, publicly funded, 
stadium would be built.  If the option expired, the team would still belong to Behring whose past 
behavior predicted that the team could relocate.  Thus, Allen’s option left a unique underlying 
threat that voters could lose their team if they did not come through with the stadium subsidy by 
passing Referendum 48.4 
4 There are a number of issues that would have made the relocation of a franchise to Los Angeles; some of those still exist today.  First, in the 1990s, the University of Southern California had already indicated its opposition to luxury seating options.  Second, residents of Pasadena were also reluctant to have an NFL play their home games at the Rose Bowl.  This would mean that the any NFL team would need to find a suitable 
4.6
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 Geographical Inspection, Population, and Income 
Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of yes votes for Referendum 48 by color-coding 
the yes-vote percentage by precinct for the most densely populated part of King County (the 
county actually extends a bit farther south and quite a bit more east but especially the latter has 
such a low population that not much is missed by the focus on the portion of King County in 
Figure 2).  Figure 1 illustrates that the residents of SoDo had only mild support for the 
referendum (the precinct containing the stadium location and the one just south; note that 
population density here is quite low, due to the commercial nature of these precincts, and these 
two are large, in land area only).  Just as clear, is that in every direction except south, opposition 
to the referendum was substantial.  The only places in support in this area of heavy opposition 
were on waterfronts.  For readers familiar with the area, this includes the Pikes Place 
Market/Pioneer Square/Pier area along the Alaskan Way Viaduct, the west edge of Lake Union 
along Westlake Avenue North before Aurora Bridge (West Queen Anne), the Madison 
Park/Washington Park area served immediately by the Evergreen Point Floating Bridge (State 
Highway 520) on the south of Union Bay, and Laurelhurst/Windemere/Sand Point North of 
Union Bay. 
The other striking feature is that the highly supportive precincts are all on the other side of 
Lake Washington — from Yarrow Point and Hunts Point, through Bellevue, and south to Renton.  
Voters living on Mercer Island were also supportive of the referendum.  In addition, moving 
south from SoDo, mixed support turns at South Orcas Street running west from Seward Park gets 
even stronger south of this South Orcas Street “divide”. 
place to build a new stadium.  Today the same constraints exist including AEG’s support from Los Angeles for the building a new stadium adjacent to the Staples Center.  
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 Proximity to the residential waterfront and income were typically correlated.  Figure 3 
provides an income profile of the same King County precincts as in Figure 2.  The entire State 
Highway 520 corridor, on either side of Lake Washington is high income, as is Mercer Island.  
The waterfront area of Laurelhurst/Windemere/Sand Point is also high income and was in 
support to the North of Union Bay.  The other area of support was along Lake Union (West 
Queen Anne).  While income and support were not completely associated, the relationship is 
visually striking in Figures 2 and 3. 
The exceptions are interesting as well.  The previously mentioned band of support south of 
SoDo is an example of a low-income area that voted for the referendum.  Also, while the far west 
end of this band is within the middle-income bands (at Seward Park and the immediately 
adjacent precincts), the rest of the precincts in this band are in the second lowest income 
category in Figure 3.  This is the area between the Seattle/Tacoma Airport (SeaTac) and SoDo, 
and it is suspected that support is related to presence of a vast number of restaurants and motels 
in the area.  Another interesting area, not by income but by lack of support for the referendum, is 
at the west end of this same general band of support (west of Boeing Field and along the west 
side of Interstate Freeway 5).  Perhaps it is the added immediate congestion of access to SoDo at 
this point that generated this strong opposition. 
In summary, through visual inspection, it is safe to characterize the precincts that strongly 
favored Referendum 48 as follows. They are 1) outside of the core of opposition from SoDo to 
downtown Seattle and to the university district and, typically, 2) at the top of the income 
distribution.  Also, it appears that support for the referendum was non-linear by distance 
(opposition immediately around the site, then support by those within easy access by car) and 
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 that income and support for the referendum go pretty much hand-in-hand.  More precise insights 
require modeling and a formal empirical approach to which we now turn. 
Background and Data 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Deacon and Shapiro (1975) originally explored the 
calculus of individual referendum voting decision (direct modeling and estimation of the direct 
demand for expenditure on publicly provided goods comes from Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973).  
As they point out, the main problem is that individual voting is not observed.  Lacking individual 
voting data, it is typical to appeal to a pivotal voter like the “median voter” (Downs, 1957).  
Under this choice, the individual calculus informs empirical analysis, but one only need analyze 
one representative individual, namely, the voter holding the median expenditure preference. 
Three other issues also arise.  What statistics represent the median voter?   For example, 
does the pivotal median preference follow from being at the median in income?  In addition, 
what is the appropriate level of aggregation for the statistical characterization of the pivotal voter 
(a comprehensive review is in Hoxby, 2000)?  Finally, there may be situations where actual 
spending outcomes are not the median voter’s most preferred outcome.  This is the well-known 
Romer and Rosenthal (1978) “reversion threat” under agenda control (see the other citations in 
the introduction as well).5   
The literature on referendum voting in the sports context is not quite so extensive.  Agostini, 
Quigley, and Smolensky (1997) estimated a voting model at the precinct level for a ballpark in 
the San Francisco area finding that socio-demographic data shape voting preferences. Their 
analysis found that higher income, educated, and high-status job voters were more in favor of the 
5However, as we stated earlier, capturing this empirically for just a county in a state wide election was not possible.  
All we can observe is that the closeness of the election is suggestive of agenda control. 
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 ballpark initiatives than their lower income, educated, and workforce counterparts. No attempt 
was made to determine whether or not proximity to the proposed stadium locations impacted 
voter decisions.  Fort (1997) studied stadium-funding referenda for their general outcome 
characteristics and the importance of agenda control, but does no formal estimation of voting 
outcomes.  Brown and Paul (1999) argue in support of the classic concentrated benefits/dispersed 
costs outcome common in the public choice approach for a city referendum in Cincinnati.  Fort 
(1999) categorizes referenda in terms of their impact on spending levels compared to spending 
levels determined by elected representatives instead.  Depken (2000) estimates fan loyalty and 
shows that it helps determine voting outcomes on nine city stadium elections.   
More recently the issue of stadium proximity has become an area of increased interest in 
the literature.  As noted, a number of studies have shown that the construction of a stadium, some 
of which are key pieces to integrated mixed-use real estate development projects, has had 
positive impacts on property values (Tu 2005; Dehring, Depken, and Ward 2007; Feng and 
Humphreys 2008, 2012; Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos 2014)).  Moreover, property values typically 
increase the closer a parcels was located to the venue.  This “proximity” effect has also been 
found in voting behavior for stadium referendum.  For instance, Coates and Humphries (2006) 
found being close to the facility increased yes vote percentages for both  sports facility referenda 
in Houston (NBA’s Rockets) and Green Bay (NFL’s Packers).  Additionally, Dehring, Depken II, 
and Ward (2008) found a proximity effect to voting outcomes in the new NFL Cowboy stadium 
in Arlington, Texas.  However, the effect of proximity on voting outcomes is potentially more 
complicated.  For instance Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2012) find in an analysis of a professional 
soccer stadium in Munich that voters nearest to the proposed stadium cite actually were more 
likely to vote against the referendum.  This “not in my backyard” effect signifies that in some 
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 sense voters may actually experience higher costs from a stadium being built (e.g. noise, 
pollution, congestion). The size, scale and use of the facility are also important to consider from 
a voter’s perspective. Does the amount, and or frequency of activity generated at the stadium or 
arena impact the voter’s decision?  Do voters consider venues with larger footprints and parking 
requirements that have a high seating capacity but low event frequency potential (football, soccer 
stadiums) different from smaller more active venues (arenas, and baseball stadiums)?  
To evaluate the impact of proximity (and other socioeconomic variables) on voting 
outcomes for the Seattle Seahawk stadium data were obtained from two different sources.  
Precinct level voting outcomes from King County for the 1997 Special Election were obtained 
from the Secretary of the State of Washington, and census tract socio-demographic data were 
obtained from the 2000 census (Social Explorer Tables (SE), Census 2000, U.S. Census Bureau 
and Social Explorer).  To link precinct-level voting outcomes with census track demographic 
information the U.S. Census Bureau in conjunction with the State of Washington has created 
Voter Tabulation Districts (VTDs) that correspond to election precincts.  However, election 
precincts do not match up directly with the underlying census tracts.  Some election precincts 
coincide with several different census tracts.  The least complicated observed result is a single 
precinct covering precisely one census tract. 
To actually match socio-demographic data with precinct voting, I utilized allocation factors 
for the 2000 census tracts found at the Missouri Census Data Center (2012).  These allocation 
factors provide the proportion of each VTD (matched to election precincts) that overlaps 
different census tracts.  Specifically, precinct level socio-demographic variables were created 
using a simple weighted average of the allocation factors and census track socioeconomic data.  
For example, suppose precinct A covers portions of two census tracts, c1 and c2.  The weights 
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 from the Missouri Census Data Center might be 1 and 2.  If Median Family Income in each of 
the tracts is M1 and M2, then our income variable for this precinct is just MA = 1M1 + 2M2.   
Turning to specification of independent variables, the general line suggested in the voting 
literature already cited was followed:  people vote in their own self-interest, subject to the price 
they will pay for the outcome.  Our primary measure of net benefit impact is proximity (data 
descriptions and descriptive statistics are in Table 1).  At the precinct level, this will depend on 
whether the benefits from living close to the stadium are overcome by the possible negative 
externalities of crowded game days (simple congestion, rowdiness, drunkenness, etc.).  
Remember, this is not about who owns businesses closest to the stadium, it is about actually 
living in close proximity so that your voting precinct close to the stadium.  It should not be 
surprising then that the actual business operators and others who still enjoy the benefits of the 
stadium without suffering the externalities (those who drive into the area for business or 
pleasure) might experience higher net benefits than those actually living close to the site.   
DISTANCE and its square were used (for nonlinearity). 
To establish distances, the boundary “shape files” for the State of Washington’s 2000 
Census VTDs were obtained from the National Historical Geographic Information (Minnesota 
Population Center, 2011).  Using ArcGIS software, centroids were calculated for the VTDs.  
DISTANCE then is the driving distance (in miles) from a given precinct’s centroid to the exact 
longitudinal coordinates of the proposed stadium site.6 
The rest of the economic calculus of voting involves price and income (controlling for 
population).  Again, each of the precinct level socioeconomic variables are calculated as just 
6 We also estimated voting models with both driving time (generated in GIS) and actual linear distance as our 
distance measures with similar results.   
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 described—the weighted average of "allocation factors" and the socioeconomic variable of each 
census tracts covered by a given precinct.  Direct measurement of population effects poses a 
problem.  Precinct population could not be obtained for 1997; using population form the 2000 
census would produce incorrect scaling with some precincts having more registered voters in 
1997 than population in 2000.  So, instead, REGISTERED VOTERS was used to indicate the 
number of individuals living in precincts that are registered to vote (subsuming the decision to 
register in the first place).7  On the other hand, scaling the rest of the variables detailed below 
using 2000 population causes no problem since 2000 is their measurement year.  Price is also 
problematic because of the multi-source revenue specification in the referendum (a variety of 
taxes, lottery and sales tax diversion, and tax forgiveness).  The approach taken was the one used 
in the voting literature that identifies groups whose welfare would be expected to change in 
predictable ways.  One way or another, housing values and incomes will indicate different 
positions on the dimension of payment for the facility.  Median precinct HOME VALUE and 
median precinct household INCOME measures these two with the usual multicollinearity 
baggage accompanying the latter (see the correlation matrix in Table 2).  It was also 
hypothesized that the portion of the precinct population OVER65 should be opposed to paying 
for long-term capital projects since they are more likely to enjoy a relatively shorter period of 
benefits. 
The rest of the variables control for a wide variety of reasons different people vote 
differently.  In percentage terms, white voters turn out at lower rates than minorities. HISPANIC, 
ASIAN, and BLACK precinct population proportions were included to consider the effect of 
race and cultural on support.  These variables were repeatedly studied by others.  It was also 
7 Issues involved with estimation and the hurdles to voting—registration, turnout, and falloff—are in Fort (1995). 
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 hypothesized that renters fall prey to a form of payment illusion since they may not understand 
that part of their rent actually goes to pay for the same services as owners.  To check for this 
possibility, the proportion of housing units within the precinct that are RENTER occupied versus 
owner occupied was included.  Education has been found in past studies to impact the voting 
choice, so the proportion of the precinct population over the age of 25 year with at least a 4-year 
COLLEGE degree was also part of the model.  Poor voters may think differently about their 
returns to this type of public spending as opposed to others they prefer.  The proportion of the 
population below the federal POVERTY line is included to account for this possibility.  Finally, 
voting can vary by occupation as well as income so we round out our variable selection with the 
proportion of the precinct population in WHITE COLLAR occupations.8 
Empirical Strategy 
Following the visual analysis of the precinct-level distribution of yes votes in section III, 
we now presents the methods used to empirically investigate the Seahawk stadium referendum 
outcome. Referendum voting outcomes were predicted using the standard, linear specification: 
 (1) i i ipcty Xα β ε= + +  
Where the dependent variable ( ipcty  ) is the percent of votes cast for the referendum in each of 
the  i  precincts,  is the vector of unknown parameters, Xi is the vector of expla atory variables 
8 Even though we could calculate the dependent variable in past works, there are no other similarities in our data that 
allow any meaningful, direct, statistical comparisons.  For example, rather than our “allocation factor” weighted 
average approach, Coates and Humphries (2006) assign all precincts in the same tract with identical tract 
information, reducing the variation across precincts.  They also create a categorical distance distinction: precincts in 
Zone 1 contain the facility site or are contiguous to the facility site; precincts in Zone 2 are contiguous to Zone 1; 
precincts in Zone 3 are contiguous to Zone 2; the rest are Zone 4.  They employ variables that measure the percent 
of the precinct population that is male and independently identify “urban” precincts.  In addition, Green Bay is quite 
possibly the most unique NFL market (if not the most unique of all pro sports markets), inhibiting any comparison 
to our football case in the State of Washington.  Finally, while Houston is more like Seattle in terms of size and city 
amenities, the referenda there concerned a basketball arena, again reducing meaningful comparison to our football 
case.  Similar problems prohibit any comparison with Ahfeldt (2011).   
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 and iε  is a zero mean disturbance term.  Also, following the literature we use a White/Huber 
“sandwich” correction for heteroscedasticity.   
In addition to this standard empirical model, in this a “group logit” model was used.  This 
model originally used by Theil's (1970) has been used to estimate vote shares for representative 
voter models in the political science literature (Mikhailov, Niemi, and Weimer, 2002, following 
the original insights in Katz and King, 1999; for extensions in multiparty votes see Kamakura 
and Mazzon, 2007, and Basinger, Cann, and Ensley, 2011).   The benefit of the group logit 
model is that it increases efficiency by giving greater weight to the outcomes with the greater 
number of votes cast, and hence smaller variances.   
To specify this model let  = population in precinct i and at issue is the improvement 
using a weight proportional to .  The group logit is a two-step procedure.  In the first stage  
(1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 � 𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑦𝑖� = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , 
is estimated and in the second stage, the proportion of voters is predicted, and the following 
analytical weights are applied to each of the I = 1, …, I precincts:  
(2) 𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑦𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑦𝑖)  
Finally, another important empirical consideration is the proper functional form of our 
distance specification.  To capture potential nonlinearities we implement two different distance 
specifications.  First, similar to Coates and Humphreys (2006) and Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2012) 
we specify distance as a series of discrete continuous rings around the proposed stadium.  
ni
ni
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 Additionally, a continuous specification incorporating both a distance and distance-squared term 
was used.   
Results 
The results of the empirical models are presented in Table 3.  The first two columns present 
the results of the standard linear probability model, with the first column presenting the model 
estimated with a continuous distance specification and the second column presenting the results 
of the model estimated with distance modeled as a serious of discrete contiguous rings.  
Specifically, the contiguous rings are delineated at 5-mile increments, with the base case being 
voting areas more than 35 miles from the stadium.  The next two columns presents the marginal 
effects of the group logit models estimated with the same distance specifications.  Note that, the 
point estimate for marginal effect of the continuous distance specification takes only 1 value (i.e. 
there is no marginal effect for DISTANCE-squared since the marginal effect is the derivative of 
the probability function with respect to DISTANCE).  In order to clarify the effect of 
DISTANCE from the Group Logit model; Figure 3, presents the predicted yes-vote probability 
conditional on DISTANCE from the stadium. 
Overall, the signs on most of estimated coefficients are as expected.  The odds of a yes-
vote are larger in precincts with more REGISTERED VOTERS.  Increases in INCOME across 
precincts increase the odds of voting yes.  Recall that this aligns with “easy access” a short drive 
away from the SoDo (as with our earlier discussion of Figure 2).  Higher proportions of minority 
voters increase the yes-vote odds.  In addition, it is interesting that odds of voting yes increase 
with OVER65.  This is counter to the hypothesis and worth further investigation in subsequent 
research.  There is mixed evidence that the probability of voting yes increased with HOME 
VALUE, at least it is significant in the models utilizing the distance band specification.  
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 Additionally, there was little to no impact of the odds of yes-votes increase with RENTER.  
While this is not a direct test of the so-called “home voter” hypothesis, it suggests that the venue 
was expected not to have a significant impact on residential property values (Fischel, 2005; 
Dehring, Depken, & Ward, 2008).  Education in the form of COLLEGE is generally not a 
statistically significant explanatory variable.  Again, the impact of POVERTY is mixed.  In the 
group logit specification the variable reduces the odds of yes voting, which is consistent with the 
idea that the poor have higher priorities for public spending. 
In terms of distance, similar results were found in all four models estimated. Specifically, 
the King County yes-vote is actually the smallest in areas in closest proximity to the proposed 
stadium site; as driving distance increases, the probability of voting increases, and then declines.  
In the contiguous rings specification yes-votes were the highest 10 to 30 miles driving distance 
from the stadium, and in the nonlinear specification voting reaches a maximum at about 27.3 
miles, (according to the estimated coefficients on DISTANCE and its square).9  The nonlinear 
distance effect for the group logit model with a continuous distance specification is presented in 
figure 4.  This nonlinear effect of proximity on voting outcomes makes intuitive and economic 
sense.  For those that actually live closest to the stadium, externalities and other disamenities will 
be largest.  It is those with the easiest access to the stadium site, but somewhat removed by a 
short drive, that will actually enjoy the amenities without the downside.  In addition, to the extent 
that voters who operate businesses in close proximity to the proposed stadium site actually do 
not live there, but instead also populate the “easy access” areas, they will be more likely to vote 
yes as well. 
9The relationship in Figure 3 is derived using the sample averages of the data and, since King County voters were by 
and large in favor the x-axis starts at 50%.  However, we are able to isolate the impact of distance and it is distinctly 
different that that found in the previous literature. 
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 Conclusions 
On June 17, 1997 voters in the state of Washington passed Referendum 48 with 51.1 
percent of the popular vote.  Qwest Field (now CenturyLink Field) was eventually constructed 
and professional football remained in the Washington.  Eventual owner Paul Allen purchased a 
time sensitive option to buy the Seahawks, spent millions on advertising, and covered the cost of 
the special election.  The election was clearly characterized by the threat that the team would be 
lost in the event of referendum failure by then-owner Ken Behring and by owner-in-waiting Paul 
Allen. 
In a precinct-level representative voter model, a number of interesting outcomes were 
observed.  Foremost, there was a nonlinear impact of distance on voting outcomes.  Direct 
inspection of the geographic distribution of yes-votes indicates weak support for the referendum 
from those living near the proposed site of the venue, outright opposition in a long corridor along 
the proposed site, but strong support in an “easy access” ring, a short driving distance from the 
proposed site.  In the parametric models yes-votes were actually lowest closest to the proposed 
stadium cite, highest 10 to 30 miles from the stadium (or peaked at 27.3 miles in the continuous 
distance specification), and then fell off again.  This nonlinear proximity effect is different than 
the findings of Tu (2005) and Coates and Humphries (2006) and signifies that, in terms of close 
proximity to a stadium, voters may actually experience higher costs (e.g. noise, pollution, 
congestion).  Consistent with Ahlfeldt and Mennig (2012) professional football stadiums in the 
United States may also exhibit “not in my backyard” voting behavior.  Moreover, this is 
consistent with voting behavior in numerous public projects such as national forests (Kim & 
Johnson, 2002; Ham, Champ, Loomis, & Reich, 2012).  
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 Second, additional socio-demographic variables impact voting as they have in past studies 
with the exception that the odds of voting yes increased as the proportion of the precinct 
population over age 65 increased.  In addition to this interesting outcome, the preference 
formation of minority voters deserves focus in subsequent research.  
Understanding voter preferences regarding the placement, type, and public investment 
package for sports facility and adjacent real estate development is an important line of research 
that the field should continue to develop moving forward. Determining voter preferences for 
proximity to different types of sports venues is a novel contribution to the field, by understanding 
how homeowners and voters derive expected future benefits from these facilities. Numerous 
studies find a proximity preference that is NIMBY at the local level, but in areas with ease of 
access within the region there is large support for the facility being built. Coates and Humphries 
(2006) found voters near to the proposed site of a new arena10 are in favor of it being built. The 
difference may in fact lie in the derived benefits from the proximity of the facility, and whether 
or not the development is part of an integrated mixed-use real estate development strategy. 
Stadiums for both forms of football are (in general) outdoor venues that are primarily in use only 
for the anchor tenant of the facility11. These sports provide a more raucous atmosphere around 
the facility, as tailgating prior to the event is a habitual routine for fans. This type of activity is 
counter to the activity generally seen in an arena venue. Anchor tenant for arenas (NHL or NBA 
or both) host only 50 events per team per year, most occurring at night, with activity at the 
facility not seen as a normal behavior. These arena’s regularly produce well over 100 event 
10 As previously discussed the Green Bay findings are unique in my opinion, not replicable in the rest of the NFL. 11 This trend is changing with facilities like the one built for the Dallas Cowboys that are more comparable to large event centers, with many re-configurable meeting spaces within the facility.  It is possible that the findings of Dehring et al. could be consistent with the home-voters expectations for activity to be generated more along the lines of an arena type venue, than a traditional football stadium.  
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 nights that are needed to keep the facility viable which in many cases spurs economic 
development (in the form of bars and restaurants) ancillary to the facility. Future work in the 
field should be directed toward trying to understand this relationship. Are facilities that are in 
consistent use (arena’s, baseball stadiums) more preferred by residents to have in close proximity 
to their homes than football stadiums (which are in use less) due to the belief that the derived 
benefits from the facilities construction will outweigh the negative impacts of the facilities 
location? Does the facilities inclusion (or exclusion) as part of greater mixed-use real estate 
development plan alters voter preferences? A greater investigation about this dynamic can help 
direct policy makers and planners in their discussion on citing of future facilities, and whether or 
not public subsidies are warranted for facilities. 
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 Figure 2.  Referendum Bill 48:  Geographic Voting Outcomes. 
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 Figure 3.  Referendum Bill 48:  Geographic Income Distribution.  
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  Table 1.  Variables and Descriptive Statistics (2,500 observations)  
Variable Explanation Min Max Mean SD 
VOTES Total votes cast 2.00 290.00 108.75 38.70 
%YES (Yes votes /VOTES)*100 8.33 90.00 57.92 10.62 
DISTANCE Driving distance from the stadium 0.31 75.11 12.40 8.09 
REGISTERED  
VOTERS  
The number of individuals registered to vote in a 
precinct  3.00 1134.00 372.05 132.14 
HOME VALUE Median Owner-Occupied home value divided by 1000 23.40 781.00 255.10 104.39 
INCOME Median household family income divided by 1,000 16.69 149.64 68.35 20.35 
OVER65 % of POPULATION over 65 1.43 43.51 11.40 4.96 
HISPANIC % of POPULATION that is Hispanic 1.18 37.10 5.08 3.51 
ASIAN % of POPULATION that is Asian 0.34 58.05 10.18 8.45 
BLACK % of POPULATION that is Black 0.12 50.06 5.02 7.09 
RENTER % of POPULATION in renter occupied housing 2.89 97.32 37.64 21.18 
COLLEGE % of POPULATION with at least a four year degree  2.12 51.15 27.79 9.77 
POVERTY % of POPULATION below federal poverty line 0.20 48.73 8.20 6.22 
WHITE COLLAR % of POPULATION in white collar occupations 15.53 68.66 45.03 10.60  
Sources: Voting data are from the Secretary of the State of Washington (2007).  Demographic data are from U.S. 
Census Bureau (2000). 
Note:  Since estimation cannot happen if precincts actually have 0% or 100% YES, one precinct was eliminated 
from the data (100% YES). 
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 Table 2.  Correlation Matrix  
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%YES 1.000            
DISTANCE 0.287 1.000           
REGISTERED  
VOTERS 
0.166 0.266 1.000          
HOME VALUE 0.079 -0.271 -0.053 1.000         
INCOME 0.235 -0.014 0.026 0.857 1.000        
OVER65 0.018 -0.280 -0.223 0.195 0.118 1.000       
HISPANIC 0.012 -0.030 -0.015 
-
0.501 
-
0.614 
-
0.138 1.000      
ASIAN 0.127 -0.235 -0.050 
-
0.215 
-
0.282 0.014 0.250 1.000     
BLACK -
0.102 
-
0.258 -0.075 
-
0.276 
-
0.447 
-
0.047 0.345 0.456 1.000    
RENTER -
0.334 
-
0.378 -0.044 
-
0.277 
-
0.582 
-
0.052 0.441 0.121 0.249 1.000   
COLLEGE -
0.085 
-
0.381 -0.029 0.706 0.663 0.045 
-
0.586 
-
0.247 
-
0.399 
-
0.072 1.000  
POVERTY -
0.284 
-
0.263 -0.059 
-
0.342 
-
0.641 
-
0.101 0.470 0.313 0.457 0.696 
-
0.330 1.000 
WHITE 
COLLAR 
-
0.172 
-
0.522 -0.131 0.709 0.573 0.228 
-
0.538 
-
0.127 
-
0.176 
-
0.019 0.828 
-
0.159  
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Table 3.  Empirical Results 
 Linear Probability Model Group Logit 
Variable continuous distance variables 
Discrete Distance 
rings 
continuous distance 
variables 
Discrete Distance 
rings 
Distance 1.167*** (0.130) -- 
0.751*** 
(0.045) -- 
Distance-squared -0.021*** (0.004) -- -- -- 
0 to 5 miles from 
stadium -- 
-3.220** 
(1.513) -- 
-4.084** 
(1.767) 
5 to 10 miles from 
stadium -- 
0.913 
(1.371) -- 
-0.383 
(1.638) 
10 to 15 miles from 
stadium -- 
7.783*** 
(1.365) -- 
7.398*** 
(1.627) 
15 to 20 miles from 
stadium -- 
8.650*** 
(1.342) -- 
8.796*** 
(1.584) 
20 to 25 miles from 
stadium -- 
7.343*** 
(1.342) -- 
8.033*** 
(1.583) 
25 to 30 miles from 
stadium -- 
7.835*** 
(1.451) -- 
8.368*** 
(1.616) 
30 to 35 miles from 
stadium -- 
3.046* 
(1.610) -- 
4.068** 
(1.982) 
Registered Voters 0.006*** (0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Home Value 0.005 (0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Over 65 0.272*** (0.045) 
0.184*** 
(0.046) 
0.306*** 
(0.043) 
0.233*** 
(0.045) 
Hispanic 0.528*** (0.092) 
0.406*** 
(0.086) 
0.679*** 
(0.084) 
0.601*** 
(0.085) 
Asian 0.316*** (0.028) 
0.253*** 
(0.027) 
0.393*** 
(0.028) 
0.332*** 
(0.028) 
Black 0.086** (0.040) 
0.069* 
(0.040) 
0.112*** 
(0.038) 
0.070* 
(0.039) 
Renter 0.006 (0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
College 0.043 (0.048) 
-0.078* 
(0.046) 
0.036 
(0.046) 
-0.069 
(0.046) 
Poverty -0.116 (0.074) 
-0.107 
(0.073) 
-0.228*** 
(0.055) 
-0.226*** 
(0.054) 
White Collar -0.159*** (0.036) 
-0.140*** 
(0.036) 
-0.183*** 
(0.038) 
-0.163*** 
(0.038) 
Income 0.208*** (0.031) 
0.187*** 
(0.031) 
0.242*** 
(0.030) 
0.212*** 
(0.030) 
Constant 27.525*** (2.524) 
38.026*** 
(2.325) -- -- 
Observations 2500 2500 2500 2500 
R-Squared 0.355 0.379 0.394a 0.4090a 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***Significant at 99% level.  **Significant at 95% 
level.  *Significant at 90% level. Marginal effects are reported for the group logit models. a 
indicates adjusted R-squared.  
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Figure 4.  Predicted odds of voting yes, conditional on distance.  
 
Notes:  Probabilities of yes votes were predicted using the mean of all other covariates.  Blue 
band indicates a 95% confidence interval.  
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Chapter 3 – A Ballpark and Neighborhood Change: Economic Integration, a Recession, and the 
Altered Demography of San Diego’s Ballpark District 
Introduction 
 One concern raised when revitalization plans are introduced is that new housing for 
higher income households would result in new forms of economic segregation or gentrification.  
This concern is even more pronounced when real estate projects are linked to the venues hosting 
professional sports teams.  The owners of these franchises are usually seeking to maximize 
revenues and profit margins associated with properties sold to or used by higher income 
individuals and families – unless subsidized by the public sector – are more robust.  If there is to 
be broader political and social support for mixed used developments linked to sports venues and 
urban revitalization it has to be understood if the new neighborhoods that are built are in fact 
economically segregated. 
 Data or information assessing whether or not if urban revitalization efforts linked with 
sports venues create higher levels of economic segregation is important.  What is equally 
important, however, is that central cities need to have more higher income residents.  To reach 
that goal some neighborhoods that attract and retain those households are needed.  The notion 
that when a city loses half of its residents that there is insufficient land to accommodate all 
income groups is difficult to sustain.  The study included in Chapter 3 does not address the 
degree to which central cities have the flexibility to accommodate all income groups without 
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 displacing anyone.  That issue, however, does need to be studied.  Instead, what is done, is to a 
carefully assess outcomes in the largest revitalization effort ever linked to a sports venue. 
 In the late 1990s the owner of the San Diego Padres and the City of San Diego 
(California) entered into a partnership for the building of a new ballpark.  The City of San Diego 
agreed to invest $186.5 million in the facility and other public entities (The Downtown 
Redevelopment Authority and the Port Authority) committed $109.5 million to the project.  The 
total public sector investment was $296 million.12  The Padres invested $115 million and was 
responsible for all cost overruns.  Those overruns would lead to a total investment by the team of 
$187.1 million for a state of the art ballpark that would permit the Padres’ ownership to enjoy 
numerous revenue streams that were not available to the team at the facility where they played 
their home games (Qualcomm Stadium.  At that venue naming rights, advertising income, and 
other revenue streams were controlled by the San Diego Chargers.13  In addition, playing in a 
facility specifically designed for baseball meant there would be dramatically enhanced sight lines 
for fans (Qualcomm Stadium was built for a football team) that would sustain higher ticket 
prices generating more income for the team. 
 At first blush this might seem like the typically imbalanced partnership between teams 
and the public sector (Rosentraub, 1997; Chapin, 2004).  In most of those partnerships a city and 
other public sector agencies invest more than the team’s owner in a new facility while the team 
receives most (or all) of the enhanced revenue streams.   What made this deal unique, however, 
was that in addition to the contribution of $187.1 million for the ballpark by the San Diego 
12 The investment by the Port Authority did not involve taxes levied against residents of San Diego but was 
generated by fees collected by the independent authority.   
13 The stadium was built for the football team and most revenue streams were given to the Chargers when they 
relocated from Los Angeles.  The San Diego Padres were created a few years later and were tenants who were not 
given access to most of the revenue streams generated by the stadium since those were already guaranteed to the 
Chargers by their lease with the City of San Diego. 
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 Padres, the team’s owner also guaranteed that $487 million in new real estate development 
would occur in a newly planned and renovated neighborhood surrounding the ballpark.  The new 
real estate developed would adhere to a plan approved by the City and the team’s owner.  The 
investment was to be in a new downtown neighborhood that would include amenities and 
elements specified by the City through its negotiations with the Padres’ owner, John Moores.  
The agreed to plan for the Ballpark District included a commitment to add 1,000 new hotel 
rooms to enhance the attractiveness of San Diego’s Convention Center.  These hotels also had to 
be designed to enhance the visual and aesthetic appeal of the new neighborhood.  Never before 
had a team owner guaranteed a specific level of ancillary real estate investment in conjunction 
with an agreement with the public sector to finance and construct a stadium or arena. .  Notably, 
long before the deadline to complete the $487 million investment (which was required across 
two time periods) the total amount of new real estate built had a market value in excess of $2.87 
billion (Rosentraub, 2010). 
 Why was a new ballpark needed?  The San Diego Padres was a tenant in a football 
stadium built for and controlled by the National Football League’s San Diego Chargers.  The 
Chargers began play at the stadium when it opened in 1967 and their lease gave them control of 
all revenues.  In 1969 the San Diego Padres were created as an expansion team and immediately 
began to play at that venue.  John Moores purchased the team in 1994.  Recognizing that the 
lease and revenue model was not sustainable his campaign for a new facility led to the 
unprecedented partnership.   
 Despite the fact that no team owner had ever guaranteed a specified amount of new real 
estate development in exchange for the public sector’s willingness to invest in a new sports 
facility, there were numerous criticisms of the partnership. There was concern that the public 
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 sector’s investment would become a subsidy, as the anticipated real estate might never generate 
sufficient new tax dollars to make San Diego’s investment prudent.  Others argued the new tax 
revenue would only enrich the downtown development authority (created and controlled by San 
Diego’s City Council in accordance with existing state law)14 and would not produce new 
revenues for the city and help taxpayers.  Some believed the development in the Ballpark District 
would merely be a substitute for what would have occurred elsewhere in San Diego and 
therefore would represent no new development or tax money.  In effect, some argued the project 
was merely a substitute for economic activity that would still likely occur within the City of San 
Diego.15 
 Issues involving the fiscal outcomes and the redevelopment effects of the Ballpark 
District have been addressed (Chapin, 2002; Erie, Kogan, & Mackenzie, 2011; Rosentraub, 
2010).  This article focuses on the performance of the Ballpark District based on four other 
criteria:  (1) the extent to which a new neighborhood was populated and sustained through the 
recession; (2) the creation of an economically integrated neighborhood (that was home to people 
from various economic groupings or income categories) in downtown San Diego; (3) the ability 
of the Ballpark District to attract young well-educated individuals as well as older higher income 
residents, and (4) the ability of the new neighborhood to protect property values during the recent 
severe recession.  Preceding the data analysis is a brief explanation of the importance of these 
criteria for public policy and cities.  A brief concluding section dealing with the role of sports 
14 In 2012 the California legislature and the Governor agreed to terminate the existence of all downtown 
development authorities.  This was done to insure that revenue produced by properties in the downtown areas were 
directed into each city’s general revenue fund.  Previously the incremental tax revenues had to be used to 
development, enhance, and maintain the revitalized downtown areas. 
15 The best summary of the criticisms of the partnership and its creation of revenue only for the downtown area and 
the corporate interests concentrated in that area is to be found in Chapin’s work (2002) and the work by Erie, Kogan, 
& Mackenzie (2011).  
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 facilities and urban development follows the analysis of housing and demographic changes in 
San Diego’s Ballpark District. 
Some Goals for the Public Sector’s Interest in Inner City Redevelopment  
 The outward migration of wealthier households to suburban cities and counties or the 
outlying areas of cities with a large geographic footprint creates a number of challenges.  In 
metropolitan regions with high levels of economic segregation it is possible to have a 
disproportionately high concentration of lower income households in a particular city 
(Jargowsky, 1996).  Communities with larger concentrations of lower income households can 
face severe problems when it comes to financing and delivering needed government services 
(Goetz, 2003).  The concentration of lower income households creates numerous other 
challenges.  As Goetz (2003: 3) observed, “Detroit typifies a city overcome with neighborhoods 
of high poverty where the middle class has fled to relatively safe and secure havens of racial and 
class exclusivity.  The city is wracked by high property-tax rates on ever-devaluing property, 
generating insufficient resources to fund essential city service and the elevated level of public 
and social services necessary to support an impoverished populace.  Its schools are underfunded 
and inadequate, and its streets unsafe….”  As many have also observed, deterioration spreads 
outward from areas where property values decline (and where properties may be abandoned) 
resulting in the flight of residents and businesses to suburban and exurban areas (Morrill, 1992; 
Davis, Nelson, & Dueker, 1994).   
 Attracting and retaining highly educated and younger residents has become a vital 
economic development goal for all cities.  Numerous researchers have underscored the 
importance of educated and younger human capital for economic development (Benabib & 
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 Spiegel, 1994; Heckman, 2003; Garmise, 2006).  Those cities that are able to attract both young 
and educated workers have experienced more growth, and that has led local leaders to focus on 
building communities that are replete with amenities and built environment that is desired by 
educated and younger workers.  Revitalized downtown areas have been shown to be especially 
valuable in the effort to attract well-educated workers (Robertson, 1995; Jang, Hughes & 
Danielsen, 1997; Rosentraub, 2010). 
 San Diego similar to other central cities has a vested interest in developing its inner city 
communities and keeping the downtown area vital and attractive to educated workers.  Some 
community leaders were disappointed that the area where the Ballpark District now stands 
suffered from stagnating levels of development and as some saw it, had substantially deteriorated.  
Others disagreed (Newman, 2006), but a goal for San Diego’s City Council was a revitalized 
downtown community that while economically integrated, was also home to a highly educated 
and young labor force with at least 1,000 additional hotel rooms to support the convention center. 
 The decline and deterioration in what was the East Village was not at all similar to the 
dilapidated downtown areas in other cities that also built new sports facilities to advance 
revitalization efforts.  There were fewer abandoned lots and there was a small residential 
population that included artists (Williams, 2004; Rosentraub, 2010).  The physical character of 
downtown San Diego and the East Village was quite different from the abandonment and decline 
that was or is evident in the downtown areas of Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, or 
St. Louis.  San Diego, however, was suffering from what some described as a sprawling 
suburbanization pattern that represented failed urban planning (Lang & Simmons, 2001; Hogan, 
2003).  Some suburban cities surrounding San Diego had grown by 1000 and 2000 percent in the 
last fifty years of the 20th century (Lang & Simmons, 2001).  San Diego was focused on trying to 
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 avoid the development patterns found in Los Angeles that had led to a sprawling environment 
many wanted to avoid.  San Diego’s leadership was focused on building thriving urban 
communities in and around its downtown area that were economically diverse but also seen as 
desirable locations for the young educated workforce trying to diversify the region’s economic 
portfolio (Moore, 2012).   
 In addition to the goal of creating an attractive neighborhood, San Diego’s leadership also 
wanted a ballpark that would help ensure that the Padres would remain in the city.  They also 
wanted to add 1,000 new hotel rooms to their inventory in order to advance the attractiveness of 
the convention center, while also insisting upon sufficient new investments in real estate to 
generate the taxes needed to provide a satisfactory financial return on the public’s investment.16  
What was also anticipated was a new economically integrated neighborhood that would be viable 
in the sense that real estate values would be protected or sustainable, and become an area that 
was home to young and educated workers.  It was hoped that the workforce would continue to 
attract companies and new start-up firms to the city.  Our research focuses on the demographic 
changes in the Ballpark District and the ability of real estate values created to endure during the 
severe recession.  
The Ballpark District: Demographic Change 
 In 2004, the census tracts that were located within the planning area designated by San 
Diego as the Ballpark District had 28,868 residents.  In 2010 there were 44,052 residents (an 
16 In noting this objective it is recognized that the money would accrue to the development authority and not the 
city’s general fund.  Without reviving the debate over the long-term benefits for San Diego, it is accurate to note that 
funds not added to the general revenue fund provide no fiscal return that can be used to support the services 
provided to residents of the entire city. 
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 increase of 52.6 percent)17,18 and there were 25,522 housing units.  This population growth, 
while impressive, needs to be contrasted with changes elsewhere in San Diego to appreciate the 
magnitude of the effects.  In terms of population growth only seven of 105 zip code areas in San 
Diego County experienced a negative growth rate.  The Ballpark District’s growth rate, however, 
made it the third fastest growing zip code in the county. The only zip codes to experience higher 
rates of growth were in the City of Chula Vista (outside of the City of San Diego).  The Ballpark 
District was the fastest growing area in the City of San Diego.  The same pattern was observed 
with regard to new housing unit additions.  
 Relative to the goal of creating a new downtown neighborhood that was growing and 
increasing the number of people living in and near San Diego’s downtown center, the Ballpark 
District had met one of the City Council’s goals.  Was the new neighborhood economically 
integrated?  Using data collected by the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG)  the 
make-up of the Ballpark District by income levels can be considered.  Table 4 presents the 
percent changes from 2004 to 2010 and the rank among the 105 zip code areas in San Diego 
County.  
Table 4. Ballpark District Zip Code Income Growth Rates 2004 to 2010 
Percent 
Change and 
Countywide 
Rank 
Household Income Levels 
Less 
than 
$15,000 
$15,000 
to 
$29,999 
$30,000 
to 
$44,999 
$45,000 
to 
$59,999 
$60,000 
to 
$74,999 
$75,000 
to 
$99,999 
$100,000 
to 
$124,999 
$125,000 
to 
$150,000 
$150,000 
to 
$199,999 
$200,000 
or more 
% Change 39.2 60.1 60.1 58.0 30.7 60.4 23.0 23.4 11.3 -17.1 
17 The data to conduct this analysis was obtained from the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) that 
creates and maintains its own demographic, economic, land use, transportation and criminal justice information 
regarding the San Diego region, www.sandag.org. 
18 Zip code level aggregation, instead of more precise census tract data, was chosen for comparison to other areas of 
San Diego because the real estate data that will be utilized later in this analysis was aggregated at the zip code level. 
Census tract level demographic data for the Ballpark District will be analyzed to differentiate its changes from the 
changes experienced at the zip code level.  
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 Rank 4 2 1 2 7 3 11 13 28 93 
Source: San Diego Association of Governments  (SANDAG) 
 
A more refined analysis appears in Figure 5; the inclusion of census tract level data 
permits a micro-level analysis confined to the Ballpark District.  A zip code level analysis 
actually includes a portion of other parts of the downtown area; the census tract level analysis 
focuses only on the Ballpark District.  A focus at the zip code level, however, looks at the effect 
of the District on portions of the downtown area immediately adjacent to the Ballpark District 
and there are benefits for the city from the external effects of development near PETCO Park.  
Figure 5 looks at changes at both the zip code and census tract level.   
Figure 5. Share of Income Ballpark District Tract and Zip Code 2004 & 2010 
 
Source: San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) 
 Relative to income integration, while the Ballpark District has become the home for a 
larger number of households with higher incomes, it has not gentrified to the point where 
moderate and lower-income families are excluded.  Within the Ballpark District, at the census 
tract level, there was a decline in the proportion of households earning less than $45,000 dollars, 
0.00%5.00%10.00%
15.00%20.00%25.00%
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2004 - Zip Code2010 - Zip Code2004 - Census Tract2010 - Census Tract
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 while households with higher income levels were a larger proportion of the community.  This 
change enhances economic integration, as the community is now home to households with lower 
moderate and higher annual incomes.  Though many have argued that the Ballpark District 
created housing opportunities that would lead to gentrification and the reduction of housing 
options for lower income families, these data suggest that fear or outcome has yet to be realized. 
It will be important to continue to track the changes within the Ballpark District; will it continue 
to be an economically integrated neighborhood as it matures? Or as its popularity and amenity 
options grow will the full potential and fear of gentrification be realized? Figure 6 looks at 
changes in the Ballpark District relative to the entire county.   
Figure 6. Share of Income Ballpark District Tract, Zip Code, & County 2004 and 2010 
 
 Source: San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) 
 The Ballpark District’s census tract and zip code have seen more growth in residents and 
new residents but still have a much greater concentration of lower income households than other 
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 parts of San Diego County (see Figure 6).  Data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, Center 
for Economic Studies “OnTheMap” program illustrates in a slightly different manner the changes 
that occurred in the Ballpark District zip code with regard to incomes.  OnTheMap can be used to 
analyze the migration of workers.  Data from 2010 were not yet available; therefore the analysis 
uses percentage of the total labor force within the Ballpark District zip code and their monthly 
earnings.   
Figure 7.  Percent Share of Labor Force by Monthly Earnings for Ballpark District Census Tract 
and Zip Code Level Performance, 2004 and 2009   
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, OnTheMap Application and LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics 
 
 The data illustrate that following the completion of PETCO Park and the further 
revitalization of the area surrounding the Ballpark District that households had substantially 
higher incomes (further evidence of economic integration).  The level of aggregation of these 
data has some limitations, but there was a clear decline in the proportion of residents with lower 
income levels.   The census tract has shifted from one that was predominantly lower income to 
one with more economic integration.  With regard to the goal of creating a neighborhood that 
0.00%10.00%
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 was more economically integrated, at least through 2010, it does appear that substantial progress 
was achieved. 
 There were agreements with San Diego for the building of affordable housing by the 
team’s owner and his real estate company.  A typical goal for large-scale projects of this type in 
California is that 10 to 15 percent of the total number of housing units would be classified as 
“affordable.”  One assessment in 2010 found that approximately 5 percent of the housing units in 
the Ballpark District were classified as affordable (Rosentraub, 2010).  The City Council, 
however, had also agreed that the developer could build some of the required affordable units 
elsewhere in San Diego (http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/01/in-september-2005-broad-coalition-
of.html). 
 A larger commitment to affordable housing was made in the area adjacent to AT&T Park, 
the home of the San Francisco Giants.  Approximately 24 percent of the residential units near 
that ballpark are classified as affordable.  The Rincon-South Beach project San Francisco 
provides a different perspective on the magnitude a commitment to affordable housing when 
sport facilities are built.  The sport facilities planned for this area of San Francisco, however, also 
include a new 18,000-seat arena in addition to a ballpark for a MLB team.  An arena creates 
more revenue possibilities for investors (concerts, etc.), and that provides more flexibility 
relative to commitments for community benefits that are not tethered to profit-making activities 
and market conditions.  San Diego’s Ballpark District including only a ballpark and its profit 
potential is far different from the two facilities that will be part of the development in San 
Francisco.  In addition, the San Francisco market creates more income possibilities for teams.  
Nevertheless, the ability of neighborhoods anchored to sport facilities to provide housing 
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 opportunities for moderate and low-income households is underscored by what is now taking 
place in San Francisco (http://www.sfredevelopment.org/index.aspx?page=62). 
 Attracting and retaining individuals employed in sectors of the economy where more 
advanced skills and education are needed enhances the attractiveness of a region to businesses.  
To provide insight into the background of people moving to the Ballpark District the occupations 
of residents were analyzed using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Center for Economic 
Studies for 2004 and 2009 (see Table 5).   
 There is considerable debate as to which educated workers dominate professions.  Indeed 
given the considerable changes in the manufacturing sector, those workers also need far more 
advanced training than was once required.  Without engaging in that extensive debate, changes in 
four sectors where it is clear more educated and skilled workers are required are highlighted in 
Table 5: professional, scientific, and technical services; management; educational services; and 
health care and social assistance.  The proportion of residents of the Ballpark District employed 
in each of these sectors rose from 2004 to 2009.  Changes in other sectors were undoubtedly 
impacted by the recession.  Lower proportions of workers in the construction and retail trades 
were expected given the downturn in the real estate industry and discretionary incomes shrank.  
Contractions in the banking and finance sectors also led to fewer jobs.  As a result, longer-term 
data will be needed to assess the changes in the regional workforce that is living in the Ballpark 
District.  The data in Table 5 are, however, encouraging in that there were absolute and 
proportional increases in sectors of the economy where more highly educated workers are 
needed.  
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 Table 5. Ballpark District Census Tract & San Diego Jobs by NAICS Industry Sector  
NAICS Industry 
Sector 
City of San Diego Ballpark District 2004 
Average 
Private 
Sector 
Weekly 
Wage19 
2009 
Average 
Private 
Sector 
Weekly 
Wage 
2004 2009 2004 2009 
Total 
% 
Share 
Total 
% 
Share 
Total 
% 
Share 
Total 
% 
Share 
Construction 25,172 5.1 18,689 3.8 42 4.9 70 3.9 $957 $1,043 
Manufacturing 44,749 9.0 40,533 8.2 71 8.3 110 6.1 $1,220 $1,299 
Wholesale trade 18,725 3.8 18,532 3.7 27 3.1 67 3.7 $1,155 $1,162 
Retail Trade 47,719 9.6 43,759 8.8 81 9.4 155 8.6 $609 $550 
Transportation & 
Warehousing 10,804 2.2 10,773 2.2 19 2.2 42 2.3 $762 $767 
Information 19,147 3.9 20,553 4.2 24 2.8 58 3.2 $1,942 $1,799 
Finance & 
Insurance 24,639 5.0 20,474 4.1 49 8.2 62 3.4 $1,441 $1,329 
Real Estate 12,131 2.4 11,335 2.3 24 2.8 46 2.6 $861 $847 
Professional, 
scientific, & 
technical services 
50,121 10.1 59,056 11.9 70 8.2 242 13.4 $1,428 $1,544 
Management 10,163 2.0 8,990 1.8 13 1.5 30 1.7 $1,390 $1,299 
Administrative & 
Support, Waste 
Management 
35,610 7.2 26,995 5.4 102 11.9 111 6.2 $627 $690 
Educational 
Services 49,766 10.0 59,167 11.9 57 6.6 190 10.5 $830** $860** 
Healthcare & 
social assistance 48,906 9.8 54,641 11.0 71 8.3 183 10.2 $866 $925 
Arts, 
Entertainment, 
Recreation 
11,705 2.4 12,070 2.4 19 2.2 60 3.3 $647 $624 
Accommodation & 
Food Services 47,856 9.6 49,023 9.9 117 13.6 232 12.9 $366 $367 
Other services 21,613 4.4 23,518 4.7 44 5.1 91 5.0 $498 $489 
Public 
Administration 12,618 2.5 12,864 2.6 2.6 2.6 36 2.0 $1,219 $1,291** 
Totals 496,804 100.0 495,239 100.0 858 100.0 1,802 100.0   
19 Converted to 2009 dollars 
** Public Sector Weekly Wages were used as the majority of jobs within this industry sector were from the public sector.  
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 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, OnTheMap Application and LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics 
 
 The changing occupational make-up of the residential base of the Ballpark District 
neighborhood is one way to illustrate the success that the district had in creating a neighborhood 
that attracted highly educated workers.  Another way to illustrate the changes within the Ballpark 
District is to examine the educational attainment statistics for residents tabulated by the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  Table 6 illustrates the breakdown of residents within the Ballpark District by 
their educational attainment. The starkest change in the residential make-up is clearly seen in the 
proportion of residents who have attained degrees above the Bachelor’s level. In 2000, less than 
1 percent of individuals living in the census tract had obtained a Master’s degree or higher; based 
on 2006-2010 ACS estimates that figure has risen to over 6 percent of the residential base.  
Table 6. Ballpark District Educational Attainment for Population Over 25 (in percent) 
Educational Attainment For Population 25 
Years and Over (in percent) 
Ballpark District Census Tract 
2000 Census 2006-2010 ACS (5- year estimates) 
Less Than High School 31.5 16.2 
High School Graduate (includes 
equivalency) 36.2 16.2 
Some College 26.1 36.6 
Bachelor’s Degree 5.6 24.8 
Master’s Degree 0.6 4.5 
Professional school degree 0.0 1.1 
Doctoral Degree 0.0 0.6 
Source: ACS 2006 to 2010 (5-Year Estimates), Census 2000, U.S. Census Bureau 
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  A related goal for the Ballpark District was to attract households that did not place 
substantial demands on San Diego for the services financed with local tax dollars.  Older 
residents typically do not have children that add to costs for school district and coupled with their 
higher income levels, this population might also have lower demands for police services.  
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the percent change for population within different age groups for males 
and females between the years of 2004 and 2010 for both the Ballpark District and the City of 
San Diego.  Both areas experienced growth in older individuals meaning anticipating 
expenditures for local government services will likely decline.  There was an interesting 
difference in the growth of residents in the Ballpark District by gender.  As depicted in Figure 4 
the largest percentage increase for males was clearly related to age.  With regard to women, 
however, there were increments in younger residents.  Notice that while San Diego saw 
decreases of certain age groups, there was growth in younger and older age groups.  This is 
further evidence of the creation of a demographically diverse neighborhood (see Figures 8 and 9).    
Figure 8.  Ballpark District and City of San Diego Male Population Growth 2004 to 2010 
 
Source: San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) 
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 Figure 9. Ballpark District and City of San Diego Female Population Growth 2004 to 2010 
 
Source: San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) 
Ballpark District: Real Estate Values 
 The severe recession provides an opportunity to understand if the new neighborhood led 
to more stable property values.  As noted, the number of housing units in the area increased by 
more than 120 percent in a relatively brief period.  Almost all of these housing units were 
condominiums, townhouses, or other types of multi-family structures.  In 2004, 6.5 percent of all 
multi-family housing units were vacant; that figure increased to 8.5 percent in 2010 indicating 
that demand for housing was still relatively robust.  The real test of property values, however, is 
the extent to which property in the Ballpark District performed better (or worse) than home 
prices in other parts of San Diego County.   The scope of our analysis focused on property value 
changes between 2006 and 2010.  By 2006, a sufficient number of the proposed housing units 
had been built and sold (in the years after PETCO Park’s opening in 2004).  Sales price data 
were obtained from Collateral Analytics for 81 zip codes within San Diego County.  The 
downtown zip code placed 15th out of the 81 zip codes in median condominium value changes 
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 from 2006 to 2010; properties in the downtown area lost 25 percent of their value.  Only one zip 
code in San Diego was stable and enjoyed a very slight (less than one half of one percent) 
increase in value.  Thirteen of the best 15 performing zip code areas were in Central San Diego 
(city) or along the northern coastal areas.  The desirability of downtown neighborhoods is clearly 
underscored, of which the Ballpark District is just one.  It must be acknowledged that the 
direction of any effects must become a concern for future studies.  It could be that the Ballpark 
District benefitted from a demand for downtown housing; it is also true that the success of the 
Ballpark District contributed to the demand for downtown housing options. 
 How did the performance of condominium real estate in downtown, and the Ballpark 
District, compare to other types of residential real estate in San Diego?  Using data from 
Collateral Analytics and the Case-Shiller House-Price Index for the San Diego metropolitan area, 
monthly percent changes were calculated (see Figure 10).  
 Real estate values in the Ballpark District were not nearly as volatile as those for 
residential properties throughout San Diego County.  Price changes throughout the San Diego 
metropolitan area have been relatively stable with prices changing within a band that was only 6 
percent wide.  With the Ballpark District the band of changes has been approximately 3 percent.  
While these changes are less than those noticed for the region, the differences were relatively 
modest.  What the pattern does illustrate is real estate prices in the new neighborhood, despite 
having a concentration of multi-family homes (condominiums and townhouses) were stable.    
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 Figure 10. Real Estate Performance: Month to Month Percent Changes, 2006 to 2010 
 
 
Concluding Observations 
 When San Diego’s voters were asked to approve the public sector’s investment in a new 
ballpark for the Padres a central issue was the investment by the team’s owner in the East Village 
to create the Ballpark District.  For most people the key issue was John Moores’ commitment of 
an investment of $487 million in new real estate development.  This created an impression that 
the public sector’s investment would be less than that made by the team and its owner.  Several 
civic leaders were interested in the partnership because 1,000 new hotel rooms would be built 
near San Diego’s convention center making it even more appealing to meeting planners.  There 
was fear the Ballpark District would lead to gentrification and the exclusion of housing 
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 opportunities for households with lower incomes.  Some feared the production of a new 
homogenous or exclusive area.   
 In total $2.87 billion of new real estate development took place through 2010 (excluding 
the funds invested in the ballpark).  If there was a concern that the neighborhood would gentrify 
and offer few or very limited residential opportunities for households with moderate incomes, the 
most recent data suggest that fear was misplaced.  The neighborhood remains economically 
integrated and the increase in the number of higher income households has made the area far 
more balanced than it was before the investment of more than $2 billion by John Moores’ real 
estate firm and those other investors attracted to the area.  The age demographics in the area are 
also well integrated as the Ballpark District has attracted older and younger residents.  The large 
increments in residents who are at least 50 years of age suggest this population group is being 
attracted to living in downtown San Diego. 
 There has also been an increase in the proportion of individuals who are employed in 
sectors where it is expected that people have higher levels of education.  Attracting and retaining 
educated workers in downtown areas is a desirable goal for long-term economic development.  
The Ballpark District seems to have attracted the individuals that are sought by most cities to 
advance their attractiveness to businesses seeking locations where there is an educated workforce. 
 The severe recession was a particular concern for any neighborhood where there were 
large numbers of new residences built in a relatively brief period of time.  In areas that are less 
well established there is the possibility that housing prices would escalate sharply during the 
boom phase, and then collapse as soon as a “bust” settled into the region.  Data through 2010 
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 suggest prices in the Ballpark District have remained relatively stable especially when compared 
with volatility throughout San Diego County and across the southwest. 
 Neighborhood advocates and those who were critics of public/private partnerships that 
were normally biased towards team owners were right to be concerned that the financing plans 
and program for a new ballpark and neighborhood in San Diego would lead to undesirable 
outcomes.  Through 2010 there would appear to be particular reasons to classify the partnership 
between San Diego and the Padres as one that produced some important successes.  Not only 
was the ballpark built, but a neighborhood was also created that appears on several different 
dimensions to be stable and a vital part of life in urban center of San Diego.  The Ballpark 
District is not an enclave home only to the region’s most affluent residents.  The community at 
this time appears to be economically and socially integrated, and prices are stable having 
survived the worst of the recession with price changes that were less volatile than those in other 
parts of the county.  While the success of any public/private partnership depends on the 
parameters used to evaluate it, looking at economic integration, the stability of home prices, and 
the attraction of educated people to a city’s center, the Ballpark District should be considered a 
success.     
 Finally, future studies must disentangle the relationship between the areas adjacent to 
downtown sport facilities and the success of nearby downtown areas.  There may be reciprocal or 
conjoint relationships that influence outcomes.  The research reported here does not address that 
complex relationship, but points to its value for future studies. 
 The Ballpark District in San Diego was able to accomplish many of the outlined goals by 
the city’s leadership. The deal struck between the public sector and John Moores enabled the 
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 development to occur in a manner that ensured the city would see a desired upon returned on 
investment in both fiscal outcomes and neighborhood and demographic changes. The idea that 
real estate development linked to sports venues leads to unacceptable levels of gentrification is 
not sustained by the evidence from the changes that occurred in the years following the 
completion of PETCO Park and the Ballpark District, the largest sports anchored mixed-use real 
estate development project to date. The careful planning and design of the project, with strict 
stipulations on the type, and amount, of housing units that were to either be preserved or built 
within the Ballpark District ensured that the desired levels of economic integration within the 
neighborhood followed. In the negotiations with developers public sectors officials have the 
ability to stipulate desired housing outcomes either through the zoning and land use approval 
process or within the contractual agreements in the designation of a developer as a “master 
developer” for the project. These stipulations should be done prior to any provision of funds for 
the project to ensure desired outcomes. In addition, it would be wise for public sector agents to 
negotiate both milestone damages and penalties that are punitive and harmful enough to 
guarantee compliance from the developer, while still allowing the project to receive the 
necessary returns to stimulate the private investment. Toeing this line can be difficult, but may 
be easier to achieve in sports facility anchored projects as the public sector routinely provides 
investments and approvals that are necessary for the project to move forward which provides 
extra layers of tools which can be utilized in the negotiation process.
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 Chapter 4 – Managing Matters: Special Districts and Repositioning of Regional Economic 
Activity through Sports 
Introduction 
 Connecting extensive real estate development to an urban revitalization strategy and an 
investment from the public sector requires a flexible and organizational structure.  Real estate 
developments of this nature require a commitment to 5 and 10-year build-outs (if not more).  As 
a result an administrative structure that can span several local government election cycles and 
deal with complex financial arrangements is necessary. 
As noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, there is an extensive literature 
documenting the modest contribution of professional sports franchises and the facilities used by 
teams to regional for economic development.  As briefly discussed, numerous studies have 
provided convincing evidence that teams and facilities create few jobs for a region’s residents 
and have not changed regional growth.  Simply put, sports and facilities alone are not adequate 
drivers of local economic development (Coates and Humphreys, 2008).  There is some 
disagreement and confusion within the literature regarding the impacts of facilities on economic 
development related to the definition of the term local.  A majority of the research conducted 
examining the impacts of sports franchises and their facilities have on economic development 
focuses on regional or metropolitan level effects (Baade & Dye 1988, 1990; Baade, 1996; Coates 
& Humphreys, 1999, 2001,2002; Rosentraub, 1997).  For these scholars there is a degree of 
symmetry in the use of the word local to mean regional or metropolitan.  More recent research, 
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 however, has focused on the impact of sports facilities, and in some instance their combined 
redevelopment efforts, at a more granular or ‘neighborhood’ level (Coates and Humphries, 2006; 
Tu, 2005; Cantor and Rosentraub, 2012). For these scholars local means neighborhood, 
community, or in some instances a single city within a region characterized by fragmented forms 
of local governments and taxing jurisdictions.  These studies do not attempt to argue that venues 
have regional economic impacts, but instead attempt to understand how projects have impacted 
economic development and change the flow of economic activity within regions and within cities.   
 In effect this other stream of research based on the ides of numerous urban economists 
looks at the effects of sports venues and linked real estate development on the distribution of 
regional activity. The work of Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) began to discuss the re-
distributional effects that arise from stadium (including arenas and ballparks) developments, and 
the associated public policy implications.  Those ideas built upon work published earlier by 
Rosentraub in Noll and Zimbalist’s collection, Sports, Taxes, and Jobs (1997b).  Rosentraub’s 
(2012) work outlining the redevelopment potential that exists from private/public partnerships 
for cities in creating master planned developments anchored by sports facilities isolated a 
potentially valuable policy tool for shifting regional economic activity and neighborhood change 
that many municipalities have been eager to harness.  
 For more than 50 years public officials and various governmental levels (national, state, 
provincial, local), philanthropic organizations, and community leaders have focused on strategies 
to revitalize struggling central cities and/or deteriorating downtown areas. These efforts are in 
response to social and economic changes that have redefined land use within metropolitan areas 
and have a micro- as opposed to a regional focus in assessing changes.  The deterioration of 
central cities, and the accompanying loss of financial strength and economic segregation, has 
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 made it increasingly difficult for these governments to provide the needed public services for 
residents. Declining service levels make cities less attractive places to live.  Needed policies 
must shift or re-align the demand for residential, commercial, and retail space from a focus on 
suburban locations to one that makes central cities desirable places to live and work. Judging by 
the redevelopment efforts currently being planned in many major cities across the United States 
and Canada many elected officials and policy makers believe or have found that sports facilities 
anchored by or to large-scale mixed-use real estate projects can bias demand for residential and 
commercial space towards downtown areas and away from suburban locations.  
 To effectively develop and plan for the building and integration of sports facilities into 
redevelopment strategies numerous state and local governments have turned to the creation of 
quasi-governmental agencies to navigate the complicated and intricate process of implementing 
redevelopment strategies. These agencies frequently lead negotiations with team owners and the 
private sector actors involved with real estate activities adjacent to or adjoining the sports facility.  
As the lead public sector decision maker in the development strategy it is these authorities that 
oversee the areas that are frequently designated as the ballpark district, the arena district, or in 
some instances, the downtown development authority.   
 The scope and scale of these organizations vary tremendously based upon their intended 
purpose of creation. As noted, some of the created authorities have responsibility for a small 
portion of a city or of its downtown area.  In other instances the span of authority can encompass 
a large section of a downtown area, the entire downtown area, or a substantial portion of a 
community.  A detailed study of these authorities or administrative structures is needed given the 
on-going interest in using sports venues anchoring mixed-use developments for urban 
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 revitalization.  If these sort of public/private partnerships are to continue, a body of research is 
needed explaining the effects and value of different organizational relationships. 
 In New York City, for example, the New York City Economic Development Corporation 
is the City’s primary agent for economic development.  The span of its authority is not spatially 
contained to newly created or designated districts.  Instead, it was created to facilitate 
development across the city’s corporate boundaries (five boroughs).  In the context of New York 
City the Corporation is not territorially fixed to any part of the city.  Organized as a non-profit 
organization its mandate is to promote and encourage investment, and attract, retain and create 
jobs (NYCEDC, 2013). In the development of both Yankee Stadium and Citi Field, NYCEDC 
provided financial assistance under the authority of the New York City Industrial Development 
Agency (NYCIDA). This assistance came in the form of tax-exempt bond financing, property tax 
reductions, deferral of mortgage recording taxes, and the exemption of sales and use taxes on 
construction and equipping costs. The franchises received assistance under NYCEDC’s 
Commercial Growth Program. Benefits conveyed under this program are based on project-by-
project negotiated agreements, and requires a level of commitment in terms of jobs, business 
location operations in return.   In addition, the parameters of every development are quite 
different.  With regards to Citi Field it was envisioned as an anchor for the substantial 
redevelopment of the adjacent dilapidated industrial area known as Willets Point and the land 
where the former Shea Stadium (that it replaced) was located.  In contrast, very little real estate 
development was part of the robust development plans for the Bronx.   
Table 7. NYCEDC Commercial Growth Program  
Company Name Amount 2014 Dollars 
Closing 
Date 
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 Alcoa, Inc. $18,200,000 $24,923,399 2000 
Avon Products, Inc. $115,000,000 $172,873,900 1996 
Bank of America, N.A. $622,000,000 $776,388,757 2004 
BlackRock Financial Management, Inc. $320,000,000 $426,064,370 2001 
Board of Trade of the City of New 
York 
$53,200,000 $72,853,011 2000 
Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. $61,500,000 $80,623,228 2002 
CBS, Inc. $401,322,000 $654,981,503 1993 
Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. $1,700,000,000 $2,630,660,192 1995 
Digitas LLC $41,200,000 $56,420,001 2000 
DoubleClick, Inc. $48,000,000 $65,732,040 2000 
Ernst & Young US LLP $159,900,000 $199,589,328 2004 
Federated Department Stores, Inc. $54,900,000 $73,096,669 2001 
Hearst Corporation $779,600,000 $999,074,348 2003 
Home Box Office $99,000,000 $131,813,665 2001 
JetBlue Airways Corporation #2 (2010) $52,800,000 $57,085,007 2010 
Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. $14,900,000 $19,838,622 2001 
Legacy Yards LLC $1,386,000,000 $1,402,655,794 2013 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company $272,671,000 $357,457,174 2002 
NASDAQ Stock Market $20,766,666 $25,921,232 2004 
National Association of Securities 
Dealers 
$20,766,666 $25,921,232 2004 
National Broadcasting Company 
(NBC) 
$1,500,300,000 $2,990,959,926 1988 
New York Post $168,915,000 $221,438,578 2002 
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 New York Times Company $538,416,000 $716,874,606 2001 
Queens Ballpark Company, LLC. $896,932,088 $1,049,350,466 2006 
Royalton Realty Associates, LLC. $3,128,000 $4,008,600 2003 
Sirius Satelite Radio $41,335,000 $58,511,184 1999 
Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC $512,000,000 $740,626,955 1998 
UBS Pain Webber, Inc. $225,405,000 $331,093,870 1997 
Yankee Stadium LLC $1,633,968,000 $1,911,633,115 2006 
Totals $11,762,125,420 $16,278,470,771  
 
 The vast majority of incentives received by the Yankees (Yankee Stadium LLC) and the 
Mets (Queens Ballpark Company, LLC.) were in the form of tax-exempt financing.  While the 
owners of the Yankees and Mets likely benefitted from lower interest rates as a result of the 
authority’s participation in the financing of both ballparks, the private sector (the teams’ owners) 
alone are responsible for repaying the obligations.  The public sector is not liable for repayment 
of the bonds. From a structural standpoint organizations like NYCEDC and NYCIDA are 
important to local governmental units because of their ability to facilitate the financing of 
projects without having to pledge governmental guarantees.  In effect the City of New York is 
not liable for any of the construction or maintenance costs of either ballpark. The importance of 
the ability for these organizations to provide for such financing will be further examined in the 
discussion of the redevelopment project proposed for Downtown Detroit.   
 The building of dozens of sports facilities across the continent since the late 1980s, and 
proposals for a new facility in Detroit and the renovation of others, has led to the creation of 
numerous new public authorities.  There is little if any research into the effects of these public 
authorities on cities.  There is too little appreciation of the factors that necessitates the creation of 
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 these authorities.  There is no real clear depiction of the span of authority for different 
administrative forms and the spatial dimensions over which their authority can be exercised.  
This chapter is designed to reduce the scale of this void in the academic literature to better 
inform public officials, community leaders, and scholars. 
 The means to this goal involves first, a clear explanation of the need for a public 
authority to deal with the building of a sports facility, the related real estate development, and the 
role of the facility and the related real estate development in a revitalization strategy.  Second, a 
schematic representation of the range of choices for the public sector in the assignment of 
responsibilities to a newly created authority for a sports facility and related real estate 
development is presented to provide a framework to understand the available options. Third, a 
detailed focus on the authorities created in Indianapolis and Cleveland/Cuyahoga County allows 
the exploration of the underlying social and economic forces in each region that prompted these 
central cities to (1) select sports to anchor their redevelopment strategies and then (2) create an 
authority to oversee the building and maintenance of the venues and ensure their fit with the 
larger set of revitalization efforts.  The local issues and forces – as will be demonstrated – 
assumed a substantial role in the structure and function of the quasi-governmental agencies that 
were tasked with leading the redevelopment strategy.  Those forces that dictated what was 
needed from and for the created authorities and the effects of the authority on the central city and 
the region will be discussed in the last section of the chapter.  In each instance varying levels of 
intergovernmental cooperation was needed to both finance and manage the development and this 
required participation by county governments and in one instance the state.  A discussion will 
also be had about how the interplay between these forces ultimately impacts the bargaining 
strategy utilized by the public sector in their negotiations with franchises.   
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 Why Are Special Authorities Needed? 
 The fragmentation of metropolitan areas has necessitated intergovernmental cooperation 
to both finance and facilitate redevelopment strategies for central cities.  Even in regions – Los 
Angeles, New York, and San Diego, for example – where the large central city was able to 
assume complete financial responsibility for the building of a sports venues and the related real 
estate without participation of other local governments – special districts or authorities were 
integral to the building of sports venues and the related real estate.  Indianapolis of course did 
their development of sports venues as an effort of a consolidated city/county government, but 
special authorities or districts were still needed to finance the sports and downtown revitalization 
strategy.  The reliance or utilization of authorities even when a single city was involved in the 
building of sports venues and related real estate underscores the need for in-depth research on the 
design, use, and implementation on authorities and special districts for sports venues. Public 
authorities are also instruments from which state governments have been able to circumvent 
constitutional debt limits (Bunch, 1991). Just as public administration research has looked at the 
role of authorities in building transit systems, airports, ports, and other elements of infrastructure, 
now that sports venues have become part of the infrastructure for urban revitalization, a greater 
understanding of authorities and districts in sustaining those assets is also required. 
 Before answering the vital question – Why are authorities needed as agents of 
governments and to achieve the goals established by cities and counties? – it is necessary to 
return to the issue of why even focus on sports to assist in a revitalization strategy.  The answer 
lies in two observations.  First the fragmentation of local governments in metropolitan areas has 
permitted (or encouraged) high levels of economic segregation.  The resulting concentration of 
lower income households typically in central cities requires those core areas to find unique assets 
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 (that cannot also locate in suburban cities) to change regional economic flows.  Second, the 
cartel structure of sports and its popularity essentially ensures that second teams will not exist in 
a metropolitan market.  As a result, if a central city secures a team’s location that amenity will 
not exist elsewhere in the region.  That establishes a base from which real estate development 
can be pursued and economic activity can be deflected into a central city shifting regional 
economic patterns. 
 From an academic perspective the modern paradigm encouraging fragmented or 
numerous local governments in regions were put forward by Charles Tiebout (1956) and the 
subsequent classic article by Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout, and Robert Warren (1961).  
These two works contributed to the development of what was labeled public choice theory that 
argued that greater efficiencies for taxpayers resulted from a having governments compete with 
each other to the chosen locations of citizens (their residents) and businesses.  Within the public 
choice paradigm, however, insufficient attention was directed towards the possible self-interest 
behavior of higher income households to insulate themselves from redistributive tax systems to 
support service demands of lower income households.  Instead, public choice theory focused on 
the anticipated benefits for individuals or businesses wanting more services that would likely be 
accompanied by higher taxes and those preferring fewer public service and lower tax payments.  
Left unaccounted for was the possibility that higher income households would segregate 
themselves into communities that would have higher taxes but restrict service availability to the 
high-income residents (turning taxes into user fees).  As a result the anticipated levels of 
competition never emerged and by the end of the 20th century there were large disparities in 
residential median income levels between suburban and central city households. 
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  Simply put, not imagined in these pioneering works was the possibility that social 
preferences would include exclusionary zoning related to racial or economic segregation.  The 
decades after the publication of these two classic articles that framed the discussions of structures 
of local government for thousands of students and public administrators (and political scientists 
and economists) were characterized not by competition for taxpayers but exclusionary zoning 
and other practices that resulted in high levels of racial and economic segregation. As detailed in 
Table 8 by 2010 there was substantial differences in the median incomes of residents of central 
cities and their surrounding counties. 
Table 8. 2010 Share of Poverty and Median Household Income selected MSA’s 
Atlanta - Sandy Springs - Roswell, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Atlanta 93,352  $44,771  13.6% 
Cherokee County 18,346  $63,520  2.7% 
Clayton County 57,649  $36,595  8.4% 
Cobb County 95,398  $59,471  13.9% 
Coweta County 14,026  $56,407  2.0% 
DeKalb County* 131,946  $47,068  19.2% 
Douglas County 16,581  $52,887  2.4% 
Fayette County 7,145  $79,276  1.0% 
Forsyth County 12,606  $81,629  1.8% 
Fulton County* 159,048  $53,580  23.1% 
Gwinnett County 108,754  $57,848  15.8% 
Newton County 14,785  $48,989  2.2% 
Paulding County 12,468  $61,496  1.8% 
Rockdale County 12,527  $53,899  1.8% 
Spalding County 14,122  $38,451  2.1% 
Walton County 12,013  $51,913  1.7% 
Barrow County 8,339  $52,391    
Bartow County 14,369  $43,825    
Butts County 3,506  $43,777    
Carroll County 20,312  $45,242    
Dawson County 3,044  $51,127    
Haralson County 5,868  $39,046    
Heard County 2,488  $39,614    
Henry County 20,839  $59,371    
Jasper County 2,609  $43,443    
Lamar County 3,011  $40,001    
Meriwether County 4,324  $35,287    
Morgan County 2,916  $45,804    
Pickens County 3,939  $48,532    
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 Pike County 2,222  $52,411    
Georgia 1,698,004  $46,252    
Baltimore - Columbia - Towson, MD Metropolitan Statistical Area  
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Baltimore  135,688  $39,113  53.7% 
Anne Arundel County 34,484  $80,908  13.6% 
Baltimore County 64,494  $62,300  25.5% 
Howard County 14,766  $100,992  5.8% 
Queen Anne's County 3,469  $78,503  1.4% 
Carroll County 8,873  $80,291    
Harford County 16,715  $71,848    
Maryland 559,937  $68,933    
Cleveland - Elyria, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Cleveland 131,829  $26,137  57.9% 
Cuyahoga County* 227,716  $41,407  42.1% 
Geauga County 7,207  $63,172    
Lake County 21,826  $52,854    
Medina County 12,951  $63,582    
Lorain County 41,612  $50,092    
Ohio 1,771,404  $45,151    
Columbus, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Columbus  168,405  $42,368  70.2% 
Delaware County* 10,037  $85,628  4.2% 
Fairfield County* 16,062  $55,805  6.7% 
Franklin County* 213,899  $47,621  89.1% 
Hocking County 4,635  $40,017    
Licking County 20,190  $51,247    
Madison County 5,726  $48,295    
Morrow County 4,709  $47,080    
Perry County 6,813  $39,387    
Pickaway County 6,508  $49,926    
Union County 4,064  $63,233    
Ohio 1,771,404  $45,151    
Dallas - Fort Worth - Arlington, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Dallas 271,575  $41,011  51.4% 
Collin County* 60,337  $77,862  11.4% 
Dallas County* 446,466  $46,909  84.4% 
Ellis County* 17,062  $57,929  3.2% 
Rockwall County* 4,967  $81,113  0.9% 
Denton County 53,457  $68,671    
Hunt County 16,876  $41,841    
Kaufman County* 12,215  $56,899    
Hood County 6,014  $52,633    
Parker County 13,712  $57,092    
Wise County 7,223  $52,117    
Tarrant County 258,595  $52,482    
Somervell County 891  $49,582    
Johnson County 18,917  $52,360    
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 Texas 4,411,273  $48,622    
Detroit - Warren - Dearborn, MI Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Detroit 259,916  $27,050  60.5% 
Wayne County* 429,408  $39,421  39.5% 
Lapeer County 11,036  $49,759    
Livingston County 12,919  $65,729    
Macomb County 105,439  $49,348    
Oakland County 122,932  $60,392    
St. Clair County 24,699  $44,706    
Michigan 1,614,110  $45,354    
Denver - Aurora - Lakewood, CO Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Denver 114,305  $45,526  37.1% 
Adams County 57,201  $52,785  18.6% 
Arapahoe County 65,173  $58,152  21.2% 
Broomfield County 3,323  $76,006  1.1% 
Denver County* 125,722  $45,415  3.7% 
Douglas County 9,985  $97,806  3.2% 
Jefferson County 46,566  $64,181  15.1% 
Clear Creek County 774  $64,822    
Elbert County 1,490  $78,550    
Gilpin County 406  $63,024    
Park County 1,501  $66,400    
Denver 114,305  $45,526    
Indianapolis - Carmel - Anderson, IN Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Indianapolis 153,933  $41,170  70.1% 
Boone County 4,516  $66,023  2.1% 
Hamilton County 13,564  $82,054  6.2% 
Hancock County 5,882  $62,195  2.7% 
Hendricks County 9,031  $66,080  4.1% 
Marion County* 184,537  $39,393  13.9% 
Brown County 1,985  $46,770    
Johnson County 14,367  $58,695    
Madison County 22,567  $39,449    
Morgan County 8,092  $53,738    
Putnam County 4,504  $44,437    
Shelby County 5,572  $46,619    
Indiana 960,402  $44,616    
Louisville / Jefferson, KY - IN Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Louisville  103,313  $42,174  64.3% 
Bullitt County, KY 7,771  $51,409  4.8% 
Clark County, IN 13,632  $44,775  8.5% 
Floyd County, IN 9,092  $49,117  5.7% 
Jefferson County, KY* 125,861  $42,535  14.0% 
Oldham County, KY 4,294  $75,724  2.7% 
Harrison County, IN 4,257  $48,775    
Henry County, KY 2,605  $40,806    
Scott County, IN 4,457  $39,134    
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 Shelby County, KY 4,952  $51,845    
Spencer County, KY 1,522  $62,579    
Trimble County, KY 1,306  $44,533    
Washington County, IN 4,434  $39,945    
Kentucky 796,208  $40,089    
Indiana 960,402  $44,616    
Miami - Fort Lauderdale - West Palm Beach, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
Miami 110,973  $28,506  22.2% 
Miami-Dade County* 500,537  $40,145  77.8% 
Broward County 256,295  $47,917    
Palm Beach County 186,355  $49,891    
Florida 3,048,621  $44,390    
St. Louis, MO- IL Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Place Poverty Estimate All Ages Median Household Income Share of Central MSA Poverty 
St. Louis 81,674  $33,657  35.1% 
Jefferson County 26,180  $52,841  11.2% 
Madison County 38,068  $51,706  16.4% 
Monroe County 1,588  $69,731  0.7% 
St. Charles County 21,735  $65,281  9.3% 
St. Clair County 42,224  $47,027  18.1% 
St. Louis County* 102,972  $55,290  9.1% 
Bond County 2,145  $46,364    
Calhoun County 548  $45,772    
Clinton County 3,016  $52,650    
Crawford County 4,669  $34,555    
Franklin County 14,097  $47,530    
Jersey County 2,204  $54,278    
Lincoln County 5,834  $50,307    
Macoupin County 6075  $45,995    
Warren County 4,089  $49,157    
Illinois 1,732,129  $52,967    
Missouri 888,471  $44,306    
Source: 2008 – 2010 ACS U.S. Census Bureau; U.S. Census Bureau, Small Area Estimates Branch  
  
When these income differentials were complemented by the loss of jobs (and therefore 
declining levels and value of commercial and industrial property) numerous central cities had far 
less revenue to produce the services residents and businesses needed.  A vicious cycle was 
created where increasing levels of economic segregation made suburban areas more attractive to 
those living in central cities with incomes that would make it possible to purchases homes in 
communities with fewer lower income people.  As more people left central cities local tax 
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 revenues declined and made it less and less possible to compete for residents and businesses.  In 
effect Tiebout’s model once implemented did lead to people voting with their feet, but they were 
not voting for the efficiencies Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren hoped would result.  Instead 
taxpayers voted for economic segregation and that substantially weakened the financial affairs of 
numerous central cities. It is true that every region or city is going to have areas of wealth and 
those of poverty. What has been occurring over the past 40 years, and ever increasingly in the 
previous decade is the extent to socioeconomic residential sorting has increased (Bischoff & 
Reardon, 2013).  
 The increasing levels of economic segregation created a competitive environment in 
which central cities needed to shift economic activity to ensure there were sufficient resources to 
produce services that matched those available in suburban areas.  The suburban areas, however, 
had several advantages in that marketplace.  First, they often limited the supply of housing (large 
plot - low density housing product) to ensure that lower income people could not afford to live in 
the area.  Second, by reducing support for mass transportation the cost to live in these areas was 
further enhanced making it impossible for lower income households to live in the areas if they 
could afford rents or any of the homes that were available. 
 To deflect regional economic activity back to central cities many different initiatives 
were tried.  First, several central cities built festival marketplaces inside older assets (train 
stations, etc.).  Most of these failed as suburban areas also built retail centers and in the following 
years even built lifestyle centers that offered suburbanites a faux downtown experience.  Second, 
subsidies were used to attract businesses, but in most instances those could be matched if not 
exceeded by the incentives offered by suburban communities.   
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  It was quickly deduced that what central cities needed to compete with suburban areas 
were amenities that could not be reproduced or offered in the same metropolitan area by 
suburban areas.  Retail centers and subsidies could easily be matched or duplicated.  What could 
not be duplicated were professional sports.  Why?  Since the supply of teams is controlled by the 
major sports leagues and each league tries to minimize the number of teams in a market area, if 
the central city was home to the team those wishing to attend sporting events that lived outside 
the municipal boundaries of the city would have to spend their discretionary money and time in 
formerly avoided community.  How to attract and retain a team became the focus of numerous 
central cities. 
 The value of sports and/or unique entertainment options was underscored by the early 
achievements by Baltimore and Indianapolis.  In the 1990s, as noted in earlier chapters, San 
Diego and Los Angeles anchored revitalization to sports venues but with expanded levels of real 
estate development.  Numerous cities followed in the footsteps of these communities, and what 
was evident in each case was that a special authority was needed to secure success. 
 Now it is possible to return to the issue of why special authorities are needed to 
effectively negotiate with teams and the large-scale development plans that when anchored by 
sports facilities can bias the location of economic activity.  The answer lies in urban politics and 
the time-span across which large-scale real estate development can be successfully and profitable 
built.   
 Mayors and city councils are often elected on four-year cycles.  The building of a sports 
facility and the related real estate development activities often spans more than two-election 
cycles.  The plan for the redevelopment of downtown Indianapolis was initially approved in 
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 1974; the complete build-out contemplated in that plan was not realized until the mid-1990s.  
The Ballpark District in San Diego spanned at least three election cycles; the completion of 
Staples Center and LA LIVE also spanned three election cycles.  The large redevelopment 
surrounding Citi Field in New York will probably take 20 years.  The recent commitment of 
Olympia Development of Michigan to further entertain the feasibility of $200 million of 
additional real estate development adjacent to a new downtown arena will take at least 10 years 
given the demand for urban real estate in Detroit and the activities of other developers including 
Dan Gilbert.  
 To create investor confidence that long-term real estate projects will be insulated from 
changing political currents or the replacement of a mayor or city council that agreed to a concept 
or deal with other elected officials that might be less supportive of the plan an independent 
corporation or entity that is insulated from political cycles is vital.  This organization would also 
be able to negotiate financial arrangements that are independent of a city’s financial 
responsibilities.   
 The success of such arrangements was initially demonstrated by the Federal 
government’s creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) that oversaw economic 
development and electrification of rural areas in the region. Roosevelt’s intentions in creating the 
TVA was to create an entity that was enabled with the power of government, but had the 
flexibility and initiative of private enterprise (Doig, 1983).  A district or special authority leads 
the building and maintenance of airports and the terminals used by airlines in most regions. Two 
of the most influential special authorities for transportation and related real estate include the 
Port Authority of the City of New York and State of New Jersey and Massport (Boston). The 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has had such success and excess revenues from 
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 projects like the George Washington Bridge, LaGuardia and JFK Airports, that their operations 
expanded to include operations such as the PATH system connecting New Jersey and New York 
City that operate under continuing deficits. The Port Authority has now grown to levels that it 
has seen is financial base erode as it takes on greater levels of debt and count more facilities 
under its’ purview (Moss, 2014).  At the current time the US Bureau of the Census reports there 
are approximately 20,000 special districts that states, counties, and cities have created to 
facilitate partnerships between the public and private sectors.  Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 
(1961) discuss the potentialities that a polycentric political system has for providing governance 
in highly complex metropolitan areas. They viewed the business of governments in metropolitan 
areas as providing the provision of public goods and services. A subset of this discussion 
concentrated on an analysis of the problems of scale in constituting the public organizations 
which provide them. The theoretical underpinnings of that analysis, and the subsequent 
scholarship that followed within schools of public policy and public administration, are what 
guides my analysis of special districts that have been created to govern the provision of the 
sports venues.  
 Local units of government are viewed as the package for which within a set of boundaries 
that public goods are provided.  A public good can be considered adequately packaged when the 
externalities of its provision are internalized within its borders. If the externalities spill over to 
neighboring communities the public good has is not fully internalized.  Ostrom, Tiebout, and 
Warren viewed several criteria as paramount to the designing the appropriate “package” for the 
production and provision of public goods. These criteria include control, efficiency, political 
representation, and self-determination. It is these criteria for which the special district in both 
Cleveland and Indianapolis were both studied and analyzed, and the recommendations for the 
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 future of special districts governing the provision of sports venues and the adjacent real estate are 
made with this theoretical basis of public administration in mind.  
 While there is an extensive literature on the performance of special districts and their 
structure for transportation, some forms of economic development, water management, and 
environmental protection, those created for sports venues and related real estate have not been 
studied with any similar level of regularity or intensity.  This is unfortunate given some of the 
special conditions that define the sports industry and the benefits it produces.  Sport by its nature 
involves conjoint production (two teams or other more than one individual required for 
competition) and that means policies and practices of professional sports leagues have to be 
considered and addressed by public sector interests in negotiations with a team. Leagues have 
been permitted to grant exclusive territories to their members, and the rules of each league 
strictly govern the ability of any member of the league to encroach on existing territories (Fort, 
2003). The ability for leagues to control the supply available in the market provides them with 
credible leverage against the public sector in their negotiations. This control of the supply 
available in the market is enhanced when credible threats can be made that a team will relocate 
to another city or region. Municipalities that currently are home to a team not only need to 
concern themselves with viable threat locations outside of their region, but also from within their 
region. Florida was once the home to the vast majority of spring training locations for major 
league baseball.  In the 1990’s the distribution of spring training franchises drastically changed 
as Maricopa County in Arizona provided new financial incentives to teams to move from the 
Grapefruit to the Cactus League.  There now exists an even split between the two states for 
spring training homes.  Those issues are not the staple of local government politics or 
administrators and require specialized expertise.  These unfamiliar factors within the business 
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 climate of sport and the long-term nature of large-scale real estate projects suggests the value of 
independent boards and districts with board members appointed to terms that span election 
cycles to avoid the maelstrom of electoral politics. 
 The extensive literature on the operation of special districts helps to frame a typology of 
the institutional arrangements that have guided the formation of these new units of quasi-
governments for infrastructure development since the formation of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.  At the initial level is the decision of the governments to be involved.  At the second 
level is the decision to assign revenues to the new unit of government (fees from lessees, taxes, 
or income from market-related activities, etc.).  Each is bounded by constraints related to the 
wealth of participating governments and their size.  At the third level is the control of any 
assigned revenue streams that the special district or authority is empowered to collect or receive. 
From a theoretical perspective the most important aspect for a special district is the certainty it 
has on both the receipt of future cash flows (assigned revenues) and its ability to assign these 
revenues at its own (and sole) discretion.  
 Why is control and certainty of both revenues and their assignment vital to special 
districts? The ability to forecast expected revenue flows allows leaders of organizations to 
develop innovative strategies for long term plans and development. As seen in the literature 
evaluating the success of infrastructure projects both Pickrell (1990) and Richmond (1998) note 
that the accuracy of traffic demand forecasts as essential to the financial viability of projects. 
Whether or a new bridge or tunnel has the ability to draw upon a large population of potential 
users, or includes a successful coordination between any number of municipalities in its 
formation, is less important to its financial success than the projection of its actual use forecast. 
A special purpose district might have increased levels of creativity in how a facility or 
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 redevelopment project is financed based upon the number of layers of municipal entities that 
empower it.  If a development project and operating special district is afforded the ability to draw 
upon assigned tax revenues streams from state, county, and local governmental entities – this 
diversified portfolio of revenue streams only enhances the potential levels of success for the 
project. In essence a diversity of assigned tax revenues streams helps mitigate risk for the 
development of the project. However, absent guaranteed controls for the future of these revenue 
streams, the number of assigned tax revenues is largely unimportant to the overall success of a 
development. What use does a non-guaranteed and predictable revenue stream have for the 
planning of the future of a project? These types of revenue streams have the ability to both make 
and/or cripple a development project.    
 The following chapter will outline the underlying social and economic forces taking place 
in Indianapolis (Indiana) and Cleveland (Ohio) that attracted these central cities to a 
redevelopment strategy anchored by sports venues. These forces assume a substantial role in the 
structure and function of the quasi-governmental agencies that were tasked with leading the 
building and maintenance of the venues and ensuring their linkage to the redevelopment strategy.  
These new agencies highlight the varying levels of intergovernmental cooperation that was 
needed to both finance and manage the development or sports venues and the associated real 
estate projects designed to re-focus some level of regional economic activity into central cities.  
Indianapolis, Marion County, and the Capital Improvements Board 
 Indianapolis’ leadership (itself led by the Lilly Endowment) built a vision for the 
revitalization of downtown that aggressively focused on sports teams, events, and organizations 
(the amateur sports capital of America), tourism, culture and entertainment amenities.  The scope, 
scale, and continued commitment to this plan across five decades has led many to consider 
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 Indianapolis’ revitalization plan to have successfully re-branded and re-vitalized a declining 
downtown and central city.  The vision created by Indianapolis’ civic and corporate leadership 
with little broad based public input has been in place, and survived five decades and five 
different mayors (4 republican and 1 Democrat). The plan was made possible by financial 
support from the Lilly Endowment, but was led by the new consolidated city/county of 
Indianapolis/Marion County and newly created Department of Metropolitan Development.  
Across more than 50 years, the State of Indiana, the City of Indianapolis, and numerous private 
companies and public authorities and organizations rebuilt a moribund downtown center and 
kept it vital. 
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s Indianapolis’ leadership believed that a consolidated 
suburban and central city local government would convince both business and residents to move 
downtown. UniGov -- the popular term given to the consolidated form of government – was an 
effort to include the wealthier residents of outlying neighborhoods into the tax base of the central 
city. Before consolidation Indianapolis had slightly more than 475,000 residents; following 
consolidation the city had 746,992 residents. The population within the older boundaries of the 
central city of Indianapolis (its pre-consolidation boundaries) would decline (like most rust belt 
cities) in the decades to follow, but by 2000 it had grown to 718,870 and by 2010 the population 
within the boundaries of the consolidated city/county had reached 820,445 residents.  
 Even with positively trending population growth in Indianapolis, the rapid growth of 
suburban counties within the region illustrates the importance and needed emphasis that 
Indianapolis and its leaders have continued to place on the development of its downtown and 
adjacent communities. Across the past decade the suburban counties within the metropolitan 
region have enjoyed growth rates of more than 20 percent (see Table 9). Arguably more 
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 importantly as illustrated in Table 8 median income levels are substantially higher in surrounding 
counties than in the consolidated city/county of Indianapolis/Marion County and poverty in the 
region is concentrated near the central city. Economic segregation is still a major issue of 
concern within the region and moving forward for the future of Indianapolis.  
Table 9. Population Trends: Percentage Change by Decade 
City/County 1940 to 1950 1950 to 1960 1960 to 1970 1970 to 1980 1980 to 1990 1990 to 2000 2000 to 2010 
Indianapolis 10.4 11.5 56.8 -4.7 4.3 5.4 4.9 
Boone 8.7 14.8 12.1 18.1 4.7 20.9 22.8 
Hamilton 15.8 40.9 35.9 50.4 32.8 67.7 50.3 
Hancock 17.5 31.1 31.6 25.2 3.6 21.7 26.4 
Hendricks 22.0 66.3 32.0 29.3 8.5 37.5 39.7 
Johnson 16.4 66.9 39.9 26.3 14.1 30.8 21.2 
Marion1 19.7 26.4 13.8 -3.6 4.2 7.9 5.0 
Morgan 19.8 42.8 30.4 17.7 7.5 19.3 3.3 
Shelby 8.0 21.6 10.9 5.5 1.1 7.8 2.3 
1 Population counts for Marion County include all independent cities in 1940-1960, and the four cities that did join the consolidated city/county 
from 1970 through 2010. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years 
 Regional trends aside, the catalyst that launched Indianapolis strategy for downtown 
development with its focus on sports was its perceived “non-image”.   The existence of a non-
image was confirmed in the national survey in the 1970s that found that Indianapolis was largely 
invisible and unknown to many Americans (Rosentraub, 1997). 
 A key agent in facilitating this strategy was the Capital Improvements Board of Managers 
of Marion County (CIB). The CIB has become the pre-eminent body for the financing and 
building of the several sport facilities in downtown Indianapolis, and other major facilities within 
Marion County.  Its structure also allowed it to assume a role in the redevelopment strategy 
through its ability to issue bonds that could be easily securitized on the financial market that 
facilitated real estate development.  In that regard the CIB was similar to port authorities in 
several other communities that while established to deal with ports and airports were also able to 
finance real estate development associated with revitalization.  For example, the World Trade 
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 Center’s Twin Towers in lower Manhattan was a Port Authority project.  At a smaller scale, the 
Port Authority of Cleveland – focused only on the port on the Cuyahoga River – has also been a 
partner in numerous economic development activities.  Indianapolis had no need for port 
authority – the airport is a separate special district – but the CIB quickly became Central 
Indiana’s vehicle for assisting in financing projects associated with economic development 
including the sport venues in the downtown area. 
  The CIB is a municipal body of Marion County that is authorized to finance, build, 
operate, and maintain capital facilities that promote convention, cultural, entertainment, and 
recreational activities.  The Indiana General Assembly created it as a municipal corporation in 
1965.  The sports and entertainment facilities that the CIB manages within Indianapolis include 
the Indiana Convention Center (ICC), Lucas Oil Stadium (home of the Indianapolis Colts), 
Bankers Life Field House (home of the Indiana Pacers), and Victory Field (home of the AAA 
Indianapolis Indians).   
 The CIB has the legal authority to issue its own revenue bonds, but Indiana law limits the 
amount of indebtedness it is allowed to incur. In order to finance the above-mentioned facilities 
the CIB has been able to call upon both the Indiana Finance Authority (IFA) and the Marion 
County Convention and Recreational Facilities Authority (MCCRFA) to issue the vast majority 
of the debt involved in their projects. The MCCRFA is an especially unique quasi-governmental 
body because of the purpose it serves. The authority was specifically created and enabled by the 
state of Indiana to acquire one or more capital improvements from local governmental entities.  
 Following the acquisition of a capital improvement, the MCCRFA assumes the facilities 
debt service obligations from the issuing entity, in this case the CIB. The CIB has been able to 
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 take advantage of the creation of this authority through its leases on Victory Field, Banker’s Life 
Fieldhouse, an adjacent parking garage, and part of the Indiana Convention Center.  As 
previously mentioned the CIB has covenants with regards to its debt load capacity and as result 
the creation of other special districts / authorities such as the MCCRFA allow it to transfer some 
of its debt load to other organizations. Even with its previously issued debt funded or refunded 
by another organization, the CIB still makes lease payments to the MCCRFA which relies on 
those lease payments to pay their debt service. The MCCRFA is a special district/authority that 
was created to assist the CIB and other local governments address their economic development 
goals. Due to its status as a special authority the MCCRFA is not subject to any debt limitations 
under Indiana law. Though the Authority may be covenanted from issuing more debt due to 
contractual obligations, by not having a legal debt limit a greater degree of flexibility exists – 
and that flexibility is utilized by other entities.  Another important reason for the creation of a 
special district is the ability to be independent of state imposed debt limits.   
 That flexibility does not mean that there are no checks on the ability of the special district 
to incur debt. That vital check is left to market forces.  If the bond market or rating agencies 
issue opinions that a special district is over extended, lenders will not purchase bond packages – 
or require terms which cause the project to be infeasible from a financial perspective.  While the 
recent recession illustrated the inability of some lenders and rating agencies to properly evaluate 
exotic financial products, suffice to note that special districts were not contributors to the 
collapse of financial markets in the past decade.  In that sense the check and balance system 
operating through market forces did not fail with regard to the fiscal stability of special districts.  
There have been instances when some special districts could not meet their financial obligations, 
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 but those default rates were not excessive nor did those lead to a lack of confidence in the entire 
financial system or any individual bank. 
 The creation of similar organizations, as already briefly noted, is not unique to Indiana. 
Limits to the overall debt capacity enacted by states required a change in the structure of how 
debt was issued. The proliferation of asset-backed securities increased interest among lenders for 
municipal debt lead to increasing roles for special districts / quasi–governmental agencies in the 
economic development process. State and local governments created these special districts for 
specific purposes and tasks and soon included or encouraged targeted real estate development as 
part of their scope of activity.  Further, as noted, elected officials believed it would be better to 
have an organization independent of election cycles and politics. Leadership of these agencies 
can then take long-term development views that might be considered unpopular and politically 
disadvantageous for elected officials to implement.   
 To illustrate the complexity of and the amount of actors involved in the structure and 
coordination of a stadium’s financing program led by the CIB an in-depth look at the structure of 
the Lucas Oil Stadium is provided.  A number of critical items needed to be accomplished prior 
to the CIB being able to enter into a lease agreement with the Indianapolis Colts. First and 
foremost, Indiana needed to pass legislation that would increase the amount of revenues that 
were legally obtainable from various existing tax revenue streams accruing to the CIB as well as 
increasing the captured allotment allowed within Professional Sports Development Area (PSDA). 
The PSDA is a designated downtown area in which State Sales and Use Taxes, State and Local 
Income Taxes, and Food and Beverage Taxes flow directly to the CIB.  These legislative 
changes are by no means inconsequential; since 2008 the CIB has been able to collect in excess 
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 of $200 million in additional taxes because of the changes. Table XX outlines the revenue by 
source from 2008 to 2012.  
Table 10. CIB State and Local Tax Collections, 2005 Legislative Changes 2008 – 2012   
Revenue Source 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 % of Total 
Innkeeper's Tax 3% 11,607,069 9,951,988 10,138,743 12,035,225 13,556,707 25.1 
F & B Tax (1%) 18,302,507 17,245,791 18,114,074 19,456,828 21,363,190 41.1 
Admissions Tax (1%) 1,114,592 1,209,082 1,239,273 988,916 1,307,404 2.5 
Auto Rental Tax (2%) 2,137,402 1,890,765 2,000,674 2,051,253 2,349,515 4.6 
PSDA Allocation 10,839,606 7,202,432 6,020,354 7,444,361 8,544,320 15.4 
Regional F & B Tax 
(.5%) 5,108,824 5,086,286 4,952,111 5,387,617 5,193,634 11.2 
Total 2005 Changes 49,110,000 42,586,344 42,465,229 47,364,200 52,314,770  
Source: CIB Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports  
 
 For the CIB an annual revenue stream in excess of $40 million dollars provides a steady 
and substantial revenue stream with which debt is serviced. Various tax streams were designated 
to help repay the bonds sold to pay for the venue’s construction (see Table 10).  Indiana permits 
its gross retail tax, use tax, and adjusted gross income tax on individuals collected within the 
geographic borders of the PSDA to be deflected to the CIB. The regional food and beverage tax 
is collected in six counties that surround Marion County: Boone, Johnson, Hamilton, Hancock, 
Hendricks and Shelby.  Marion County itself imposes the rest of the taxes including, an 
Innkeeper’s Tax, Admission Tax, Food and Beverage Tax, and an Auto Rental Tax. Aside from 
the food and beverage tax these tax revenues are largely considered either user or tourist taxes 
and can be considered largely exported taxes to tourists or those who directly enjoy the facility.  
 In addition to the numerous local governments that have authorized the assignment of 
revenues to the stadium project, a number of different quasi-governmental agencies are involved 
in ownership of the facility prior to it being leased by the CIB to the Indianapolis Colts. First 
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 Indiana provides an authorization for the Indiana Finance Authority (IFA) to issue debt for the 
capital project. For Lucas Oil Stadium this meant the issuance in $666.5 million in bonds. The 
interest on the bonds issued by the IFA can be excluded from gross income for Federal tax 
purposes, and exempt from Indiana’s income tax as well. These exemptions make the bonds 
more attractive to investors, and if the project were to have gone to market with non-exempt 
bonds the interest rates of the bonds would likely been much higher. The IFA then takes the 
proceeds from the bond offering and loans it to the Indiana Stadium and Convention Building 
Authority (ISCBA), which is the authority under which the stadium was built. This entity was 
created by the state with its task to finance, design, construct, and own Lucas Oil Stadium (and 
the expansion to the Indiana Convention Center). Under its ownership the facility receives its 
property tax exemption. The ISCBA then enters into a stadium lease agreement with the Indiana 
Office of Management and Budget, which in turn subsequently enters into a sublease agreement 
with CIB.      
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 Figure 11. The Structure of Stadium Finance in Indianapolis  
 
 Decision makers in Indiana and the consolidated governments of Marion County and 
Indianapolis have made a conscious policy choice to provide to the CIB a substantial level of 
authority. This appointed (non-elected) body is responsible for the allocation of almost $100 
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 million dollars in tax revenues from both state and local sources in 2014. The next question that 
is valid to ask about authorities like the CIB, is if they aren’t responsible to voters to whom do 
they report?  
 The CIB consists of a nine-member board.  Six members are appointed by the Mayor of 
Indianapolis, the Marion County Board of Commissioners (MCBC) appoints two (2) and the 
Indianapolis City-County Council appoints one board member.  With respect to authorizing any 
types of official action a majority of the board constitutes not only a quorum, but also agreement 
amongst a majority is required to take action. From a decision making perspective that means 
that it only takes agreement among five (5) members and as a result the Mayor of Indianapolis in 
a functional sense has a high level of control of the actions taken by the CIB. When playing out 
potential decision making scenario’s why is this fact important? It is key, because of certain 
stipulations regarding the composition of the board itself.  First and foremost, of the six mayoral 
appointments, only four are allowed to be of the same political party, and the two MCBC 
appointments must be of different political parties.  In addition, one of the Mayoral appointments 
must be engaged in the hotel or motel business within Marion County.  
 Due to its structure, in practice, the CIB is a tool that allows the mayor of Indianapolis – 
as long as he/she leads the political party without internal opposition -- to steer the development 
agenda. For example, a democratic Mayor has the ability to appoint four democratic board 
members, while the MCBC is obligated to appoint a democrat as well. This establishes an 
effective majority to pursue the agenda and plans favored by the mayor. The argument can be 
made the board has the ability to promote the development agenda of the Mayor, while at the 
same time keeping the Mayor at a safe political distance from the CIB’s decision making process. 
The CIB’s budget is approved by the Indianapolis – Marion County City-County Council, and 
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 not the Mayor. It is easy to surmise the amount of political maneuvering that can impact the 
CIB’s decision-making process.   
Gateway Sports Complex, the City of Cleveland, and Cuyahoga County  
 The City of Cleveland and its attempts to use investments in entertainment, cultural, and 
sports facilities to revive a declining central city provides an interesting contrast to the strategy 
employed in Indianapolis for two very compelling reasons. Unlike the consolidated city-county 
that is Marion County and Indianapolis, Cleveland is a separate and distinct political entity from 
Cuyahoga County.  As a result, a very different administrative structure was required.   Second, 
the plan put forth for redevelopment in Cleveland did not employ a detailed strategic plan and 
vision for the redevelopment of its downtown that was at the heart or driving force behind 
Indianapolis’ plans and aspirations. Cleveland’s vision can be viewed as only a general strategy 
or loose vision (Rosentraub, 2012).  
 During the 1960’s and 70’s Cleveland experienced an outflow of its residential 
population equal to just over a third of its 1960 population. This exodus was fueled by race riots 
in the late 1960’s. Cleveland’s loss of population continues; by 2010 the city had fewer than 
400,000 residents. Population loss within the region wasn’t limited to Cleveland. Table 11 
illustrates the difficulties that the region was having attracting and retaining its residents.  
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 Table 11.  Population Changes in Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, and the Metro Area 
Year Cleveland Cuyahoga County MSA 
 Population Change Population Change Population Change 
1980 573,822 -177,081 1,498,400 -222,435 2,173,734 -63,766 
1990 505,616 -68,206 1,412,140 -86,260 2,102,207 -71,527 
2000 478,403 -27,213 1,393,978 -18,162 2,148,143 45,936 
2010 396,815 -81,588 1,280,122 -113,856 2,077,240 -70,903 
2012 390,928 -5,887 1,265,111 -15,011 2,063,535 -13,705 
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, various years 
  
The loss of population, coupled with the relocation of numerous major business and 
substantial job losses within the manufacturing sector, signaled the Greater Cleveland economy 
was undergoing significant restructuring. Local politics, issues, and the actions by local elected 
and civic leaders were important to this restructuring, but played a small role in the wake of the 
changing nature of the manufacturing sector and increasing levels of both foreign and domestic 
competition. As the economic restructuring began to shake the city and region, Cleveland 
endured a fiscal-political crisis. While these events encouraged even more people to leave the 
city, they also set in motion the beginning of Cleveland’s revitalization effort. A key piece to this 
revitalization strategy was the Gateway Economic Development Corporation.    
 The Gateway Economic Development Corporation of Greater Cleveland (hereafter, 
Gateway) is the creation of the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County organized under Ohio’s 
revised code. Gateway is a nonprofit corporation authorized by the State of Ohio to enter into 
cooperative agreements with counties and cities to acquire, construct, renovate, equip, lease, 
manage or operate a sports facility.  An important and noteworthy difference between the 
structures of the financing between the original financing for the facilities in 1990 in Cleveland, 
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 and the complicated multi governmental lease pass through structure in Indianapolis is a result of 
the 1986 changes to the US tax code.  
 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made several changes to what could be considered a tax-
exempt bond.  Under the new requirements a bond was considered taxable if more than 10 
percent of the bond proceeds were utilized by a non-governmental entity and more than 10 
percent of the debt service for the bond was secured was used either directly or indirectly by a 
private business (Zimmerman, 1997). It is apparent that sports venue could violate the former 
requirement, but bonds can be considered tax-exempt as long as they do not violate both tests.  
The requirement that bonds must be issued by a governmental entity in order to be considered for 
tax exemption requires public sector participation in the financing of sports facilities.  As a result 
of the 10 percent rule for debt security, a team’s lease cannot practically contribute a large 
portion of the debt service needed to repay the bonds. Gateway’s financing of the facilities in 
1990 created the ability of a much simpler structure because the industrial development bonds 
that were issued by Gateway for the project were grandfathered in as tax-exempt. The difference 
is observable in the structure of the Cleveland Browns Stadium financing which utilized the 
Certificate of Participation model, where the Cleveland Cuyahoga County Port Authority acts as 
the initial ground lessee from the City of Cleveland, which then leases the facility to the city, and 
ultimately to the Cleveland Browns (Rascher, 2006).  
 In May of 1990 Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, and the newly created Gateway Economic 
Development Corporation of Greater Cleveland entered into a three party agreement to finance, 
build, and own a new arena for the Cleveland Cavaliers and a baseball stadium for the Cleveland 
Indians in downtown Cleveland. As part of the agreement Cuyahoga authorized an excise tax, 
commonly referred to as a “sin tax” because it is was collected on the purchase of cigarettes and 
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 alcohol (technically a sumptuary tax) to finance the construction, debt service, and operational 
costs of both facilities.  The Gateway Board is made up of five members, two members are 
appointed by Cuyahoga County and Cleveland.  In Cleveland the Mayor and the City Council 
each appoint one member of the board.  With the Democrats in control of both institutions one 
party essentially appoints the two members.  The 3-member county council was comprised of 
three elected county councilors chose in at-large elections selected Cuyahoga County’s 
representatives.  After the structure of county government was changed a new council chose one 
delegate and the county executive chose the other.  The mayor and county executive appoint the 
chair of the Gateway board.   
 The Gateway Corporation is also responsible for the leases negotiated with each of the 
teams.  The initial documents were agreed to by all parties in the early 1990s and approved by 
Cleveland’s city council and the county’s commissioners.  The original leases did not produce 
sufficient revenues for Gateway to fulfill its financial responsibilities that included (1) 
maintenance of both venues and the public spaces between the arena and ballpark, (2) the 
payment of the assessed property taxes to the Cleveland public schools, and (3) the salaries of 
Gateway’s employees.  Facing bankruptcy in 2003, Gateway’s board entered into negotiations 
with both teams.  In 2004 new leases were agreed to with the teams that provided sufficient 
revenues to support all of Gateway’s financial obligations with regard to operations and the 
payment of property taxes.  In addition each team agreed to assume responsibility for all 
maintenance expenses of $500,000 or less and individual maintenance expenses could not 
aggregated.  What that meant is that if all the carpets in each suite had to be replaced, each 
suite’s carpet was classified as a separate project and thus costing less than $500,000.  From 
2004 through 2014, the teams paid for all maintenance expenses and the public sector was only 
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 responsible for the arena’s roof, heating and air conditioning system, and the foundations of each 
building.   
 The Gateway Board and the teams jointly approve the corporation’s annual budget.  Once 
accepted by all parties, the teams make quarterly payments to fund the Gateway Corporation’s 
annual operating expenses that include the corporation’s professional staff and the salaries of the 
staff hired to provide security for the venues.  The Gateway Corporation’s executive director 
works with both teams to ensure that the needed maintenance projects are undertaken and 
completed.  Gateway is still responsible for ensuring that the facilities are appropriately 
maintained and has the authority to require any and all projects be funded and accomplished in a 
timely fashion.  The teams cannot refuse to implement any required maintenance project 
approved by the Gateway board. 
 In 2014 the county’s voters are being asked to renew the sin tax to provide revenue 
needed for Gateway’s responsibilities enumerated in the new lease.  If the voters do not extend 
the tax then the city and county will have to rely on operating expenses and other revenue 
streams (property or income taxes, fees, interest income, fines or revenue from licenses) to meet 
their responsibilities as outlined in the 2004 lease. 
 Gateway assumes an important role for the city and the county as it issues the bonds for 
the arena and ballpark.  The bonds do not constitute a debt or liability for Cleveland, or 
Cuyahoga County. What is a flaw in the design of Gateway – as compared to the Capital 
Improvements Board in Indianapolis – is that no revenue streams were assigned to it to ensure 
that the public sector’s responsibilities under the leases could be fulfilled.  In essence Gateway’s 
board negotiated a lease with the teams that was approved by a set of public officials.  Elections 
and then a change in the structure of county government replaced a number of the public officials 
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 who approved the leases.  As a result, Gateway is now dependent on a new set of officials and 
another vote by county residents to ensure that elements in the lease are fully executed.  Note 
that the structure in Indianapolis ensures that the Capital Improvements Board can access the 
resources needed to fulfill the terms of any lease.  Gateway as it is structured cannot do that. 
 
Olympia Development of Michigan, Downtown Development Authority, and Detroit’s Future 
 On March of 2013, Governor Richard Snyder announced the appointment of an 
emergency financial manager – Kevyn Orr – to take charge of Detroit’s financial situation. Orr’s 
appointment meant that Detroit’s elected officials no longer were responsible for the city’s 
financial affairs and policies, they would be kept informed of decisions, but no longer had 
decision making ability in the city’s business affairs. The future and fate of Detroit was now in 
the responsibility of a bankruptcy attorney appointed as an emergency financial manager by the 
Governor and not by an elected representative of the voters and taxpayers of Detroit.   
Three months after appointing an emergency financial manager, Governor Snyder announced 
that the Michigan Strategic Fund had approved a plan and development strategy between the 
Detroit Downtown Development Authority and Olympia Development of Michigan (the real 
estate development arm of Ilitch Holdings, the parent company of the Detroit Red Wings and 
Detroit Tigers).  What is referred to in legislation as the Catalyst Development Project “CDP” for 
Detroit is estimated to involve $650 million dollars of investment in downtown Detroit has the 
potential to link two areas of the inner city where development efforts are underway. It is 
difficult for most to conceive a situation where a city is about to enter bankruptcy, while at the 
same time putting forth a development package that only guarantees the completion of $450 
million dollar event center and parking garage for the Detroit Red Wings.  
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  The overall public/private financing has been described as a 60/40 private-public 
financing split.  The publicized story does detail vital elements of the existing commitments. 
What follows is a careful assessment of the CDP with an emphasis on how different 
governmental agencies involved in the project will have a large impact on the overall 
redevelopment in downtown Detroit.  
 Prior to delving deeper into the implications of the CDP for Detroit, it is necessary to 
understand the number of steps and stages of intergovernmental cooperation that were necessary 
to ensure a new event center in downtown for the Red Wings could become a reality. The key 
quasi-governmental agent is Detroit’s Downtown Development Authority (hereafter, DDA). 
Detroit’s DDA was created in 1976 pursuant to Act. No 197 of the Public Acts of 1975 by the 
State of Michigan.  The DDA was created to engage in efforts to halt property value declines or 
deterioration within the city’s downtown business district and promote business growth. In 
general, within Michigan, a downtown development authority is a tax increment finance 
authority empowered to enable to participate in the financing of activities to achieve the goals of 
reversing decline within a designated development area.  In 2012 the legislature authorized 
Detroit’s DDA to use specific tax increment revenues levied after July 1, 2010 (which are 
defined as catalyst project revenues) to fund the CDP. From a policy perspective this amendment 
was defined only to apply to cities within Michigan having over 600,000 residents while also 
requiring at least $300 million in capital investment. House Bill 5463 passed 27 to 11 in the 
Senate on December 5th 2012 and 58 to 49 in the House on December 12th – from a contextual 
standpoint during the same time period “right-to-work” legislation was introduced and ultimately 
signed into law by the Governor. The right to work legislation passed without a single 
democratic vote in the House, and the CDP legislation passed with very little democratic support 
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 as many who supported the project took a hardline stance against any republican sponsored 
measures during this time period.   
 Tax increment financing (TIF) is an economic development incentive tool that is widely 
used to advance development. The mechanics of a TIF can range from fairly simple to complex 
calculations depending on the number of municipalities that can claim taxing jurisdiction within 
a designated area. A local governmental entity will designate a certain proposed area as a TIF 
district.  Statutes are routinely created requiring the district’s to be part of distressed or blighted 
area, but that is not always the case. The current assessed value of the property within the 
designated area is assessed at the establishment of the TIF district, and that is the base from 
which the increment is then calculated in the years following the establishment of the TIF district. 
Tax revenues derived from the growth in assessed valuation of the property (or other defined 
taxing instruments at the establishment of the district) are then available to pay for permitted 
economic development costs within the district.  A key to TIF district’s is its ability to access 
revenues calculated from all local taxing jurisdictions, and keeping that revenue separate from 
the overlying governmental entities (Dye and Merriman, 2000). The hope for the newly defined 
TIF district within the DDA is that the commitments for private investment in the area stimulate 
enough incremental tax revenues to service issued debt in conjunction with the arena, and 
prophesized ancillary real estate development. Figure 12 below outlines the newly defined CDP 
area within the city of Detroit.  
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 Figure 12. Catalyst Development Area, City of Detroit Downtown Development Authority  
 
Source: City of Detroit Downtown Development Authority 
 A common misunderstanding regarding Detroit’s DDA is its relationship to Detroit and 
their financial connections to each other. The DDA is its own separate legal entity but it is a 
component of Detroit for financial reporting purposes.  This designation as a component of city 
government is a result of the appointment of the DDA’s Board of Directors by Detroit’s mayor. 
In addition, the Detroit City Council confirms the mayor’s appointments and is also responsible 
for the approval of the DDA’s budget. The DDA’s status a separate legal entity and the fact that 
the funds that it dedicates towards a wide range of projects are held by separate legal entities 
from the city, allow the agency to continue its business independent of Detroit’s fiscal situation.   
 The enabling legislation specified the revenues that could be used for catalyst project and 
would be pledged for the repayment of bonds issued by the Michigan Strategic Fund (“MSF”) to 
finance a portion of the construction costs of the events center. The tax increment revenues that 
are considered catalyst project revenues include ad valorem property taxes and specific local 
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 taxes attributable to the levy by the State under the State Education Tax Act 331 of 199320, and 
by local or intermediate school districts that were levied on or after July 1, 2010.  
 The CDP allows for the DDA to restart its collection of school property tax revenue that 
would have otherwise would have been diverted to the state. What about the CDP that allows the 
DDA to capture revenues that would have otherwise have been lost to the city?  As part of the 
passage of Proposal A by the voters in Michigan in 1994, which impacted school property tax 
revenues, tax increment plays are only permitted to capture school tax revenue in order to cover 
existing debt service. Any amounts over and above debt service are required to be returned to the 
State. Therefore the passage of the CDP, allowed for state school tax revenues that would have 
left the city of Detroit, with an unsure ultimate home, to remain in the city for economic 
development purposes through the DDA.   
 The MSF bond offerings will be split into two separate and distinct phases. The first, 
already agreed upon and guaranteed phase of the CDP, includes $450 million in bond proceeds 
dedicated to the building of the Events Center and an attached parking deck. Figure 13 below 
will detail the structure of the financing and ultimate ownership of the Events Center. As the deal 
is currently contemplated, the DDA will enter into a concession management agreement with 
Olympia Development Michigan who will then assume full management, operational, and 
maintenance obligations for the facility. Pending all final approvals from Wayne County for its 
contribution to the financing of the facility, ownership of the facility will flow through a few 
different special purpose governmental entities. Initially the EC will be owned by the DDA, who 
will then transfer ownership to the Detroit / Wayne County Stadium Authority (which currently 
owns and maintains Comerica Park and Ford Field) who will lease the facility to Wayne County, 
20 The act declared that beginning in 1994 there is a levied state education tax on all property not exempt by law form ad valorem property taxes at a rate of 6 mills.  
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 which will then sub-lease the facility back to the DDA which will then enter in the previously 
described concession management agreement.  
Figure 13. Structure of Financing and Ownership of Detroit’s New Downtown Events Center 
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  An important difference between the private and public sector and how their 
contributions to the deal are characterized is how land is characterized in the public financing 
split. ODM’s private land acquisition and project related costs at the time of the MSF 
inducement of the bonds was characterized as $47.8 million and considered part of the overall 
$450 million dollar financing package. This land was conveyed to the DDA in order to assemble 
the necessary land to site the events center, at the same time parcels from the City of Detroit and 
Detroit’s Economic Development Corporation were also conveyed to the DDA for the project. 
This conveyance from the city and EDC totals 39 vacant parcels of land for $1. In addition, 
while ODM is responsible for the on-going maintenance of the facility, as part of the financing 
of the facility a Capital Maintenance Fund has been established to the tune of $500k per year 
increasing at 4% for the life of the 30 year bonds.    
 As part of the $650 million dollar CDP project, ODM committed to the development or 
inducement other private developers to $200 million in additional developments within the 
defined catalyst development area. The public sector has agreed to a number of benefits in order 
to trigger this development commitment. Both the city and EDC have made on-going 
commitments to convey to the DDA additional parcels of land to be held for development within 
the defined CDP. The current deal involves the transfer of 36 parcels, 33 from the city of Detroit, 
to the DDA. The DDA has additionally agreed to pledge up to $62 million over an 
approximately thirty years for debt service payments to be apportioned pro rata by project. A 
crucial piece to this agreement is the time frame for which the ancillary development is required 
to occur in order for the projects to qualify for MSF financing. ODM must commit or induce 
others to commit to the $200 million of investment within five years following the opening of the 
new events center. The development projects that will make up the $200 million of investment 
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 are allowed to occur anywhere within the designated CDP area – and may include retail, office, 
business, residential, hotel and various other commercial uses. Current projects that are under 
consideration that have been proposed by ODM include renovations of 1922 Cass, Detroit Life 
and Blenheim buildings which would create over 50 housing units and approximately 5,000 sf or 
retail and 70,000 square feet of office space.  Other projects currently being contemplated for 
feasibility are a new parking deck with ground floor retail, a hotel, and a mixed use 
office/commercial/retail space. Other projects that are necessary to provide the infrastructure for 
the development of the CDP, including a new DTE substation, can be considered as part of the 
EC Ancillary development project. Though the infrastructure work is necessary to set-up for the 
future growth, it won’t stimulate the type of activity within the district that many have 
considered vital to success of the project for downtown Detroit.  The deal between the public and 
private sector in Detroit did not follow the example set in San Diego, which made the public 
funding of the ballpark explicitly contingent on development guarantees by the Padres’ owner. 
This deal was portrayed to be similar to other partnerships, but as the documents continue to be 
formalized the promised ancillary development is not an explicit guarantee. The DDA has the 
ability to allow for other developers to invest and receive the public dollars that are available to 
be spent within the district, but the bulk of the public sector investment will flow directly to 
Olympia Development without any guarantee that the recipient will in turn invest money in real 
estate near the arena. In my opinion that is a major failing of this agreement between the public 
and private sector, and places its ultimate success in very precarious position – and ultimately 
what downtown Detroit most needs is an immediate, concentrated infusion of private investment 
to provide confidence to the market that things have changed within the Motor City and the 
future is bright.  
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  What essential functions or empowerments should an authority that is tasked with 
development of real estate anchored by a sports facility have to help facilitate and ensure 
successful outcomes? First, the financing package that is put together by the authority that will 
oversee the relationship between the public and private sector needs certain safeguards. The 
authority needs to be empowered by the government(s) that provide for its creation to retain the 
ultimate and irrevocable consent by these entities to control the designated revenue 
source(s)/stream(s) that have been outlined to finance the facility to, at a minimum, the 
retirement of the debt service that funded the construction and development of the project. 
 Second, the individuals that hold the decision making responsibility for the authority need 
to be able to make long-term decisions for the success of the development that are not beholden 
to the fickleness of election cycles. For this reason authority decision makers should not be made 
up of elected officials, and should have terms that span multiple local election cycles. By 
providing this empowered separation from the election cycle the authority can make decisions 
that it believes are best for the long-term future of a development without having to continually 
operate under the threat of a changing political climate. It is important to remember that the 
strategies put in place by authorities are most effective when they can be done so under a certain 
set of assumptions of future conditions. Separation from political cycles is a safeguard that 
should be put in place for an established authority.  
 Third, the authority needs to make a positive decision regarding what parties will be 
responsible for both operational and maintenance (routine and capital) for the life of the 
development. There are a wide ranging set of pro’s and con’s to how this relationship should be 
structured, an overarching prescriptive recommendation for how that should be set up is 
imprudent to make due to the uniqueness of every development that does take place. However, 
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 what is important is that the outlined responsibilities need to be done prior to the provision of 
funds for the construction and development of the development and need to include detailed 
operating and management agreements that painstakingly detail each party’s responsibilities for 
the life cycle of the facility. Ideally a designed authority needs to be empowered to act as its own 
separate body following the construction and development of a project. The goals of the public 
sector need to be clearly outlined prior to the establishment of an authority, and these goals 
should then provide a clear set of objectives and outcomes that the authority has the 
empowerment to then set out and accomplish.  
 Fourth, in setting up an authority, and in the case of a special district it’s specific 
geographic borders, is extremely important to have a full understanding of the economic 
geography of the region with which the development will take place, and the municipalities with 
which the development will derive its revenue streams. This make-up can have far reaching 
implications for the success of the development, and in many cases of regional economic 
development implications. To appreciate the importance of this situation one can look at the 
action taken by California governor Jerry Brown and his work to effectively eliminate 
redevelopment agencies in the State of California. Through employing TIF districts within 
central cities for the purposes of financing redevelopment, central cities, like what was done in 
San Diego, created small powerful development arms which received tax revenue flows that 
were above and beyond what was needed for debt service that were kept separate from General 
Fund revenues. The state fearing the increasing power of the TIF jurisdictions repealed one of 
the most useful, and arguably successful, economic development tools that it had employed. To 
ensure that this type of situation does not occur, but still allowing for the utilization of TIF’s as a 
tool for economic development, authorities should be placed on limits for revenue they can 
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 receive. Any revenues above and beyond what are needed for debt service, and reasonable 
administrative costs, should be returned to the municipalities with which that revenue stream was 
derived from. What limits these organizations from them simply issuing debt to continue to 
allow them to capture further future revenue streams? – targeted debt limits that are tied directly 
to the project tasked at hand to develop.  
 Overall usage of authorities and special districts should serve targeted and limited in 
scope, economic development purposes. An organizational structure which allows an authority to 
develop beyond its intended development purpose only will put further fiscal strain on the host 
governmental units. Management structures should be put in place to allow for the authority to 
operate its maintenance obligations following the retirement of its debt service – otherwise the 
authority should dissolve following the resolution if fears of strengthening entities outside the 
jurisdiction of the general fund of governments exist.
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 Chapter 5 – Concluding Remarks 
 Public and community leaders remain interested in linking sports venues to urban 
revitalization, city identification or image-building activities, and overall economic strategies.  
These activities are not limited to large cities.  Recently, Lansing, Michigan, for example, 
announced plans to enhance a minor league ballpark that will include a number of residential 
properties built alongside the facility that will provide residents views of the action on the field.  
Community leaders want to create a “Wrigley Field and Wrigleyville environment” that is 
capable of enhancing Lansing’s image as a city that is more than a state capitol 
(http://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2014/03/lansing_lugnuts_apartments_bas.html).   
 Recognizing that  public policy agenda continues to include the idea that sports venues 
should continue to be at the center of revitalization and re-branding efforts it is appropriate for 
the sport management field to (1) study this phenomenon, (2) inform public decision-makers and 
leaders of business groups to the best practices to be followed to ensure their goals are achieved, 
and (3) identify the ways in which projects meet private revenue expectations while also 
producing benefits taxpayers and a city’s residents expect.  As noted in many junctures in this 
work, it is necessary for the sport management field to recognize the possibility that the interests 
of citizens or residents could be different from those of elected officials and business leaders.  
That possibility for conflict requires research that looks at projects and relationships from the 
perspective of all groups.  Successful redevelopment is defined by satisfying to the extent 
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 possible community interests, business interests of the sports’ industry, and those of elected and 
business leaders in a local community.  There is sufficient evidence available that the needs of all 
of these groups can be satisfied or at least enough overlap be found to ensure projects are 
successful. 
 There is a long-history of academicians assuming prominent roles in the debate over the 
value of sports venues and teams to influence regional economies, business elites, public 
decision-makers, and community leaders.  Congressional committees, state legislatures, and 
numerous municipalities have relied upon those efforts.  That legacy began in the 1970s and it is 
probably accurate to note that Roger Noll and James Quirk were among the first (1974) and they 
were soon joined by Rosentraub (1978).  The 1980s saw the complement of academicians 
involved in this process of informing public leaders increase as Rodney Fort, Andrew Zimbalist, 
and Alan Sanderson emerged as leading figures in the field of sports economics linked to public 
decisions.  Today suffice to note that Brad Humphreys and a score of other extraordinary 
scholars have joined the fray.  There is now a strong stream of research (that has included the 
establishment of new journals and academic associations) that has created an important legacy or 
tradition that spans the disciplines of economics, political science, urban planning, public 
administration, and sociology (to name a few) where leading academicians are seeking to inform 
and advance public policy and the bounds of sport management research focused on sports and 
economic development.  This dissertation is a complement to that tradition. 
 This dissertation was designed to complement the body of research by joining a new 
stream of activity that forges a new path in this proud tradition.  This addition to an emerging 
area of research is a result of the second or third phases in the process of informing public and 
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 private (team) decisions.  The first round was defined by studies that illustrated that teams and 
the venues they used had little or no effect on regional economies.  A second phase or what 
could be considered an adjunct to the first was that the team sports industry constituted a small 
portion of any region’s employment base.  Sports management scholars found similar results 
(Chalip 2004) and urge an expanded paradigm to understand that full-scale of the economic (and 
social) impact of sports.  At the same time, as a result of a Brookings Institution 1996 conference 
on the effect of sports on cities and economies, a new stream of research was also initiated.  This 
new area, given the fractionated nature of local governments and their tax bases (accompanied 
by reduced levels of intergovernmental financial transfers to local governments) was designed to 
understand if changing the distribution of regional economic activity could enhance the fiscal 
returns to individual cities.  There is now sufficient evidence to suggest that positive fiscal 
returns can be produced for cities from the deflection of discretionary spending by regional 
residents (import and export tourism).  The findings by Humphreys, Nelson, and Rosentraub (to 
name a few) suggest the value of addressing numerous related public policy/sport management 
issues associated with the decision to use sports to change patterns of regional economic activity.  
This dissertation focused on three vital issues:  (1) the extent to which sports anchored 
development leads to unacceptable levels of demographic homogeneity and high levels of 
economic segregation; (2) the ability of sports-anchored development to create sustainable 
communities relative to maintenance of property values; (3) the role of strategies to advance 
popular support if referenda are associated with proposal for the building of sports venues; and 
(4) perhaps most importantly an understanding of the administrative structures required for 
success in the building of new neighborhoods anchored by a sports venue and involving large 
private sector investments to realize a city’s fiscal and development initiatives. 
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 The first study investigated the spatial voting patterns of registered voters in King County 
and the preferences for the public provision of a new downtown stadium for the Seattle 
Seahawks. Several important lessons can be learned from the experiences within King County in 
the development planning process for the building of sports facilities. This study found that 
residents of King County exhibited a not in my backyard or “NIMBY” proximity preference to 
the stadium, but in areas with ease of access within the region there was large support for the 
facility being built. This was consistent with the literature for stadiums, but counter to findings in 
other studies Coates and Humphries (2006) which looked at the unique case of the Green Bay 
Packers and an arena in Houston. These contrasting findings direct future scholarship to develop 
a deeper understanding on whether or not voters will support public sector investments in sport 
venue anchored development, the type of activity that interests voters (which sports, concerts, 
shows etc.), and the frequency of events at venues that are preferred by voters being asked to 
invest tax money in a partnership with a team owner.  It is also clear that preferences change 
with regard to proximity to the facility to voters and the intended use of the venue and the related 
real estate uses.  Second, the study highlighted the importance of framing the arguments to 
secure voter support.  Paul Allen purchased an option to buy the team but his willingness to keep 
the team in Seattle was contingent on an acceptable public/private partnership to build a new 
stadium.  The public was also pressured as the existing owner was committed to relocating the 
team unless Paul Allen (or another individual) purchased the franchise.  As a result the 
referendum was framed as an investment on one person’s terms or face loss of the team.  In that 
milieu voters were not given a range of unpressured choices and had few choices.  Future 
research on voter preferences for subsidies for sports facilities would be wise to investigate what 
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 impacts (if any) did the framing of the facility as part of larger redevelopment scheme have on 
the outcome of the referendum, and the spatial components of these preferences.  For example, in 
San Diego there was a higher level of support for a public/private partnership even though there 
was a threat of the team’s relocation.  What defined the vote in San Diego, however, was a 
guaranteed level of private support for the renovation of a stagnant neighborhood without any 
apparent signs of growth.  Sport management academicians should develop insights and 
strategies and to provide forecasting information to both private and public decision makers on 
the likelihood of outcomes of their electoral initiatives based on development plans and voting 
models.  More contributions like that included in this study are needed to better inform decision-
makers involved with the new business of sports and public/private partnerships.  
 The second study highlighted the outcomes of the building of PETCO Park and the 
development of adjacent land in downtown San Diego now referred to as the Ballpark District. 
The groundbreaking partnership between the Padres and San Diego included development 
guarantees for ancillary real estate development in return for public investment in the building of 
a new ballpark for the Padres. There were many skeptics fearing the prophesized incremental tax 
revenues would never be realized and that a gentrified area would be developed that would 
exclude residential opportunities for a broad segment of San Diego’s residents.  There was fear 
that an exclusive enclave within the city would be built to meet the needs or requirements of 
higher income households. The inspection of both the demographic and economic changes that 
occurred in the neighborhood following the completion of PETCO Park illustrated that the fears 
of gentrification have not materialized. Returns on investment for the city became so successful 
that it (and other redevelopment agencies in California) had their powers revoked because their 
projects were too successful and revenues materialized above and beyond expectations. How 
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 were the returns so easily ensured on the project? The city required as part of the deal that the 
adjacent developable real estate to the ballpark would be done within a 5 year timeline. This 
commitment for new investment ensured property tax growth which would create the needed tax 
revenue flows to finance the development.  The outcomes and success of the Ballpark District 
shows us the importance in the planning process to ensure that the above stated fears never 
materialize. San Diego through land use approvals and contractual agreements for the Ballpark 
District with the private sector was able to require that an economically integrated neighborhood 
would be created. The City of New York in their negotiations with the developers for the land 
adjacent to Citi Field have a contractual agreement and commitments from the private sector for 
35 percent of permanent affordable housing units will be part of the neighborhood. With prudent 
planning and negotiation the public sector can be sure that their goals can be achieved, and 
realize a return on their investment for these projects.  
 Sports management academicians have to lead the research into the full effects of 
public/private real estate development projects that are anchored to sports facilities.  As 
illustrated by the case study of San Diego, a new model for enhancing a city’s economic base 
while also expanding the base of affordable housing may well have been developed.  This can be 
an important tool for city’s trying to advance affordable housing opportunities while also 
ensuring that there is an appropriate mix of households to stabilize its financial base.  Planners 
and policy analysts have been looking for tools to achieve this objective.   There is a possibility 
that a valuable tool exists involving sports venues.  This is a very unexpected outcome especially 
in light of the initial studies that dominated public policy, sport management, and urban planning 
for decades dealing with the economic effects of sports venues.  There is now sufficient data to 
suggest that what many initially explored had a major flaw.  Sports can be a tool for reaching 
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 important economic advantages, and if that finding is sustained by future research then a 
substantial portion of the existing research needs to be reinterpreted. 
 The third study focused on the management and administrative structures required to 
ensure that a sports venue and the related real estate relocate economic activity as intended. 
Without an appropriate administrative apparatus the goals of the public sector from an 
investment in a sports venue cannot be realized.  The last part of the dissertation took a deeper 
look into the organizational structures and management practices in cities that have successfully 
used major sports venue(s) as part of a successful redevelopment strategy. The investigation 
pointed out the differences in the structure of the authorities that were charged with managing 
the sports facilities and redevelopment efforts in Indianapolis and Cleveland.  The quasi-
governmental agencies in these two cities were examined to glean important information on how 
their structure impacted the implementation of their redevelopment strategies. Following a 
discussion of these designs for implementing redevelopment in these two cities, the current 
strategy that is being discussed for a new events center in Detroit was examined, and how its 
structure will likely impact the speed and way in which the downtown is developed.  A key 
takeaway from this investigation is that it would be wise for practitioners to follow the 
prescriptive principals laid forth previously in the public administration literature.  There are 
numerous examples of successful authorities and the lessons learned should inform the 
organizational structures used to ensure that the desired real estate development takes place and 
that the sports venues fulfill their mission and role in assisting in the deflection of economic 
activity into a central city.  There are management models that have more likelihood of success 
than others, and there is every possibility that what is being proposed for Detroit will not succeed 
in achieving what Michigan and Detroit need to assist in the city’s revitalization.  
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  I believe the study and practice of sport management needs to make a concerted effort to 
include in its academic footprint a role at the forefront of public policy and civic discussions.  As 
this dissertation identifies, leadership should include a focus on the relocation of regional 
economic activity that advances the fiscal interests of central cities.  Sport, with its prominence, 
attracts a continual focus in the media. The discourse regarding sport and the impact it can have 
on communities and the economy needs to evolve beyond the traditionally bloated economic 
impact figures – that have gotten so large that even the NFL did not feel comfortable releasing its 
study for the impact of the Super Bowl on the New York City economy. A more clear 
understanding of the neighborhood impacts that sports teams, their facilities, and the community 
benefits that they can create is where the discipline can inform leaders in their decision making 
process, and illustrate that sport management can continue to be a field in the forefront of 
discussion.  As Mills noted in the 1990s, it is time for policy analysts to concentrate on the 
locational effects of sports within regional economists and move away from long-honed studies 
of marginal or non-existent macro-regional effects. 
 This dissertation took a deeper look into the spatial applications of the business and 
governance of sport with regards to voter referenda, urban redevelopment and neighborhood 
change, and the structure, organization, and management of special district or authorities. 
Directions for future research correspond to each of the three studies. The first study leads itself 
first to an extension of the model to the entire State. Next future research should apply this model 
of analysis to other elections, ultimately leading to a comparison of outcomes across elections. 
The second study lends itself to the future tracking of the ballpark district in San Diego. A 
similar analysis should be done for other sports anchored redevelopment projects (e.g. Columbus, 
OH, Los Angeles, CA, Glendale, AZ, Denver, CO, Pittsburgh, PA), ultimately leading to a 
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 comparison of outcomes across these developments which will allow policy makers to discern 
important differences in plans and structures that impacted outcomes. Utilizing the theory’s laid 
forth in Public Administration by Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren (1961) the third study through its 
analysis of the special districts in Cleveland and Indianapolis established a framework for 
analysis that should be extended to other special districts outside of the Midwest in the financing 
and development of sports facilities.  
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